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Internal review is the local commander's in-house audit
function; and as such forms an important part of the local
commander's system of management controls. Recently,
increased emphasis has been placed on internal review
because of the increased awareness of the need to manage
accountable resources, and the internal review function's
potential for improving the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness of operations. This thesis examines the
history and development of auditing in general and internal
review in particular, presents the current status of inter-
nal review in the Department of Defense, and analyzes the
effectiveness of current programs. Five alternatives of
internal review organization are analyzed for effectiveness,
and a decentralized but hierarchical organization proposed
for implementation. Other recommendations include organizing
the internal review function in a direct staff relationship
to the local commander, and the placement of local audit





A. GENERAL - 10
B. OBJECTIVE -- 19
C. METHODOLOGY - 19
D. ORGANIZATION 2
II. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE --- 22
A. GENERAL 22
B. TYPES OF AUDIT 32
1. General -- 32
2. Public Sector - 33
a. General 33
b. Three Basic Types 34
c. Other Types 34
d. Financial and Compliance 36
e. Economy and Efficiency 37
f. Program Results -- 38
3. Summary 39
C. LEVELS OF AUDIT - 40
1. General -- 40
2. External Auditing - 41
a. Private Sector 41
b. DON 43

3. Internal Auditing 43
a. General 43
b. Authority - 45
c. Purpose -- 45
d. Organization - - 45
e. Concentration - 46
4. Internal Review 47
a. General 47
b. Authority - - 49
c. Purpose - 50
d. Organization 50
e. Concentration 50
£. Summary - 52
D. BENEFITS OF INTERNAL REVIEW 53
1. General - -- 53
2. Characteristics of Internal Review 53
3. Benefits of Internal Review 59
E. REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNAL REVIEW 66
1. Organization 67
2. Staffing 68
3. Work Performance 69
4. Command Support 70
F. SUMMARY - - --- 71
III. STATUS OF INTERNAL REVIEW 72
A. INTRODUCTION 72
B. GENERAL - - 74

C. INTERNAL REVIEW IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
CDA) 7 7
1. History - - -- 77
2. Current Organization -- 78
3. Staffing - --- 83
4. Work Performance - - - 86
5. Summary - 89




3. Staffing - - 92
4. Work Performance - 93
5. Summary - - 95




4. Staffing -- 104
5. Work Performance -- 106
6. Summary 107
F. INTERNAL REVIEW IN THE U.S. NAVY 108
1. Background -- 108
2. Organization -- 111
3. Staffing 115
4. Work Performance - -- 121
5. Summary 127

G. SUMMARY - - --- 128
IV. ANALYSIS OF CENTRALIZATION/DECENTRALIZATION --- 136
A. INTRODUCTION - 136
B. PROBLEM - 137
C. ALTERNATIVES - - 138
D. CRITERION OF CHOICE -- 139
E. EFFECTIVENESS --- - - - 140
F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES - 143
1. First Order Analysis 143
2. Second Order Analysis 151
G. SUMMARY 157
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 160
A. INTRODUCTION --- - 160
B. GENERAL - 162
C. AMPLIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE 166
1. Local Organization and Staffing -- 166
2. Department Organization 173
3. Definition of Secondary Responsibilities 176
D. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DON 180
E. SUMMARY 184
APPENDIX A INTERNAL REVIEW IN THE U.S. MARINE CORPS -
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE -- 188
APPENDIX B INTERNAL REVIEW TRAINING COURSES -- 191
LIST OF REFERENCES -193




II -1 EXTERNAL AUDITING § INTERNAL AUDITING AND THEIR 42
RELATIONSHIP TO INTERNAL REVIEW
III-l U.S. ARMY INTERNAL REVIEW ORGANIZATION 7 9
III -2 INTERNAL REVIEW STAFFING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 8 5
DEFENSE
III -3 INTERNAL REVIEW TRAINING COMPARISON OF USA AND 87
USN
III -4 INTERNAL AUDIT STAFFING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 94
DEFENSE
II I -5 USMC INTERNAL REVIEW STAFFING g8
III -6 USMC INTERNAL REVIEW ORGANIZATION 99
III -7 USMC INTERNAL REVIEW WORK PERFORMANCE 100
III -8 USMC INTERNAL REVIEW REPORTING 101
III-9 ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION OF USN INTERNAL REVIEW 114
FUNCTION
III -10 GRADES OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO USN INTERNAL REVIEW ng
FUNCTIONS
III-ll SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF USN ACTIVITIES WITH 120
INTERNAL REVIEW FUNCTIONS
111-12 EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNAL REVIEW IN THE DEPARTMENT 135
OF DEFENSE





"For the want of a nail, . . ." This often quoted
parable cleverly summarizes the results of inadequate
resources or, perhaps more properly, the delayed reaction
to the inadequate management of resources. Today's
commanders, commanding officers and of f icers-in-charge of
United States Armed Forces are being challenged to
accomplish expanded mission objectives while holding
constant, or even decreasing, the amount of resources used.
This observation is evidenced by the following quotation
from Major Michael E. Thorn, USAF who was the Air Force Cost
Analyst of the Year of 1976:
"There can be little argument over the proposition
that the military is competing for natural resources -
on a scale it has never before encountered. Although
mission requirements are increasing, the critical
supporting elements of money, material, and manpower,
are in short supply. In addition, there is little,
if any, relief in sight. This dilemma has placed a
premium on the effective management of allocated
resources at all levels of the military." 1 J
As further evidence of the "classic" proportions of the
military's resource management problem, consider the
following remarks made recently by the Honorable





"We are seeing a classic budget problem. At the same
time that we have significant pressure for a stronger
national defense posture we have the counterpressure for
a balanced budget. The two objectives are competitive
and in the attempt to satisfy both, the effect on
Military Readiness can be devastating." [ 2 J
The above remarks and observations are, in effect, summarized
by the following excerpt from a recent speech by Mr. Cordell
Smithfield, Senior Cost Analyst Headquarters, U.S. Army
Transportation Command:
"The common goal at every level and location within
the Services is a technologically advanced, strongly
manned, well equipped and thoroughly trained force,
ready to perform its mission at any time, any place.
Unfortunately, we exist in an environment today in
which the successful attainment of this goal is
becoming more and more difficult. On the one hand we
are faced with an array of ever increasing requirements
driven by shifting threats, changing technology, and
serious modernization needs, and on the other hand with
concurrently decreasing resources driven by social or
congressional attitides and rapidly rising unpredictable
inflation." £ 3 J
The high visibility attached to the problem of resource
management and its relationship to the topic of this thesis
is expressed by the following remarks by Congressman Brooks,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation and National
Security of the House Committee on Government Operations:
"During this and the previous Congress, we have devoted
a great deal of attention to reviewing the adequacy and
effectiveness of the Department's (of Defense) internal
management controls . . . During the past three years
we have made extensive reviews of many of the Department's
(of Defense) audit activities." f^J
The basic response of the U.S. Navy (USN) to the
overall problem of resource management described above was
11

the implementation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) in 1961 under the direction of then Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara . zf 5:37_7
Davis Novick, the "father of program budgeting" £"5:40_7
states :
"The primary reason for program budgeting is that it
provides a formal, systematic method to improve decisions
concerning the allocation of resources. Obviously,
these allocation problems arise because available
resource supplies are limited in relation to the demands
for them." £ 5:48 J
The Budgeting phase of PPBS was carried out in the
traditional incremental manner until the forced introduction
of the Zero Based Budgeting approach for the submission
of the Fiscal Year 1978 Operations and Maintenance, Navy,
appropriation. This requirement was not levied upon the USN
by President Carter's reforms as is commonly thought by some;
but by the Senate Appropriations Committee who, dissatisfied
with a perceived inadequacy in the normal justification books,
called for the strawman zero base submission cited above.
C 6:C-677
Dennis S. Ippolito has explained the difference between
the "traditional" incremental and the "new" zero based
approach as follows:
"Budgeting in the United States has traditionally been
incremental - that is, budget review has been primarily
concerned with the funds requested above the current
level of spending. Under incremental budgeting, most
agencies and programs have a base - that is, a certain
commonly accepted activities and expenditures - which
is continued from year to year and is not ordinarily
12

subject to detailed review. There is, as a consequence,
a high degree of stability and continuity (emphasis
addedj from one year's budget to the next. Over time,
the incremental changes that are made can have a
dramatic cumulative effect, but the room for immediate
maneuver is limited.
Zero-base budgeting, on the other hand, requires
detailed examination of the entire budget, not just
the increment. Its emphasis on comprehensiveness means
that the same scrutiny must be applied to all programs
and agencies, regardless of their longevity,
legislative mandates, and past committments. No prior
assumptions are made about the justification for or
inviolability of an agency's base. Indeed, each agency
has a 'zero base.' If effect, zero-base budgeting simply
requires that all items in the budget be reexamined each
time a new budget is prepared.
To achieve this general objective, a zero-based
system requires that certain kinds of information be
collected and that specific analytical tasks be
performed. For each discrete activity within an agency,
descriptions and justifications, goals and objectives,
and performance measurement standards must be provided."
[ 7:193-194 J
Implicit in the PPBS is a system of management controls
during the budget execution phase. Robert N. Anthony has
defined "Management Control" as " . . . the process by
which management assures that the organization carries out
its strategies effectively and efficiently." £ 8 : 3 J
Since "efficiency is the ratio of outputs to inputs"
C 8 : 5 J , and "effectiveness is the relationship between . .
outputs and . . . objectives" £ 8 : 5 J , and the term "inputs"
is synonymous with "resources"; it follows, by Anthony's
definition, that an effective management control system is




As the head of an activity, the commanding officer,
by definition, directs the system of management and
operational controls and is responsible to higher authority
for the proper functioning of his or her activity including
effective and efficient resource management. Most
operational controls such as the type of forms to be used
and the various routine procedures to be followed, are
established by higher echelons and it is the responsibility
of the local commander to ensure their proper execution.
The methods employed to ensure the proper execution of
operational controls and the efficient use of scarce resources,
in effect and by definition, constitute a management control
system. [ 8:2-3 J
One of the components of any management control system
is the ability for self -inspection of operational controls
and other management controls. C 8:444 J This self-
inspection has been an integral aid to management since
antiquity, but was first recognized as a "profession" in
the private sector in 1941 with the establishment of the
Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc. The U.S. Government
in general and the USN in particular, first formally
recognized the role of internal audit as a result of the
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (10 U.S.C. 5061)
and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950
(31 U.S.C. 66a); which provided the statutory authority




The concept of internal audit envisioned under the above
legislation was (and still is) that of an agency or
department-wide organization reviewing the operations of
that agency of department as a whole. Internal review is
an extensive of this philosophy to the "local command"
or ''field activity" level of operations within a particular
agency or department.
Prior to 1976 however, the only guidance regarding
internal review in the USN was set forth in the Navy
Comptroller Manual Volume I which defined internal review
as a comptrollership function consisting of eight functions
closely related to financial comptrollership or liaison with
the Naval Audit Service (NAVAUSDVC)
.
In 1976, with the issuance of Secretary of the Navy
Instruction (SECNAVINST) 7510.8 dated 15 October 1975
entitled: "Internal Review in the Department of the Navy,"
the Navy formally implemented internal review and broadened
its scope to include areas outside of financial comptrollership,
such as any areas subject to inefficiency, misapplication of
funds, fraud or theft. SECNAVINST 7510.8 reflected the USN's
basic philosophy that internal review is an essential element
of a commanding officer's system of management control within
his or her activity f9J, by defining the objective of
internal review as follows:
"The objective of the Internal Review function is to
aid the Commander, Commanding Officer or Comptroller in
their role as funds administrators by assessing the
15

fidelity with which prescribed procedures are being
followed for the accounting and expenditure of
appropriated and non-appropriated funds." £ 10:2 J
In consonance with this philosophy, SECNAVINST 7510.8
tasked various headquarters commands with issuing
supplemental instructions to subordinate commands, and
tasked the USN's Auditor General to develop and conduct the
requisite training and provide technical guidance to internal
reviewers. This action was taken in order to develop a
management control capable of providing the following benefits
which were extracted from a review of professional
literature
:
1. Internal review is a strong flexible management
control tool of basically unlimited scope, which the
Commander can use at his or her discretion.
2. Internal review is responsible directly to line
management, not to outside agencies.
3. Internal review allows the Commanding Officer to
concentrate effort and expertise on areas within his -
or her cognizance which are suspect of, or susceptible
to efficiency, ineffectiveness, fraud, over-
expenditure, questions of fact; or areas too
financially complex to permit a rapid assessment by
the Commanding Officer as a layman.
4. If well done, the work of an internal review
function will not be duplicated Cbut will be built
upon) by outside agencies, specifically the General
Accounting Office (GAO) or the Naval Audit Service
(NAVAUDSVC)
.
5. Independent internal review affords harried line
management an excellent opportunity to "get out of
the trees and look at the forest."
6. Internal review serves as an expert flexible
advisory staff to the Commanding Officer.
16

7. Internal review has the propensity to identify
legitimate dollar savings which line management can
apply to other areas.
8. "Internal review augments the commander's ability
to respond immediately to warning indicators within
the command by performing evaluations of command
programs, procedures and operations; especially those
related to expenditures of funds, use of resources
and the control of command property, material and
supplies." £ 11:118 J
9. Internal review can serve as the commander's focal
point, clearinghouse and follow-up reviewer for
previous audits by external sources or previous internal
reviews; and as liaison with external audit agencies.
In short, if properly organized, staffed and executed,
internal review could provide invaluable aid to line
management in many areas and serve as an extension or
alter ego of the commanding officer.
The benefits to be obtained from internal review are
unfortunately dependent on and subject to the following
limitations and/or constraints which were extracted from
professional literature:
1. The scope of internal review is a direct function
of the organization's objectives and the resources
available to accomplish those objectives.
2. The detail and breadth of analysis possible varies
directly with the resources available or the quality
of those resources.
3. The cost of internal review varies directly with the
degree of detail, frequency of review and breadth of
analysis desired.
4. Internal review is particularly sensitive and





5. Internal review can be severely limited by a lack
of independence, or even the appearance of less than
total independence.
6. Internal review, if not the beneficiary of the
requisite support and/or resources, might not be
accomplished at all.
The problem with internal review in the U.S. Navy, as
perceived by the author, is one of ineffectiveness as a
result of a combination of the limitations and/or constraints
listed above. That this perception is not unique, is
supported by the recent actions of the NAVAUDSVC , which
included a review of the internal review program during its
fiscal year 1979 audits C^J and concluded:
"The policies outlined in SECNAVINST 7510.8 are only
being partially accomplished. Many Naval activities have
not established an internal review program and many of
those that have, limit the scope of the internal review
staff to areas not directly related to mission
accomplishment." C 9 : 3 J
In addition, the Task Force on Evaluation of Audit,
Inspection and Investigative Components of the Department
of Defense included seven recommendations specifically
addressing the internal review function in its report to
the Congress and the Secretary of Defense dated 1 May 1980.
f 117
Given the relative infrequency of external audit visits
and the increasing visibility of efficient resource
management, the internal review function will become
increasingly vital to the local commander in executing his
or her responsibility as an accountable resource manager.
18

The task to the USN , and of this thesis, is to determine
the best method of accomplishing effective internal review.
B. OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the best
method of accomplishing internal review in the USN. The
objectives therefore are:
1. Determine the degree of compliance with current
directives and preferred practices in the USN.
2. Determine the underlying causes of non-compliance.
3. Examine alternatives to improve the effectiveness
of internal review.
4. Make recommendations as to which alternative offers
the best probability of increasing the effectiveness of
internal review in the USN.
C. METHODOLOGY
First, a literary search was conducted to establish the
current policies and prescribed practices for internal
review in the USN. The search also attempted to ascertain
the current degree of compliance within the USN and
included USN and Department of Defense (DOD) regulations
and reports as well as relevant professional journals,
periodicals and textbooks from private sector literature.
Next, alternatives for the conduct of internal review




Then, measures of effectiveness and an effectiveness
model were defined for the internal review function.
The various alternatives were analyzed based on the
above model and the results evaluated and presented.
Finally, conclusions were drawn and recommendations
offerred.
D. ORGANIZATION
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I
is introductory in nature and provides an overview of the
subject and the rationale for the thesis.
Chapter II discusses the field of auditing in general
as a means of providing background to the reader. It then
differentiates the internal review function from the other
levels of audit in order to provide the reader with a
perspective on the role of internal review. The relation-
ship of internal review to other, more familiar types of
auditing such as Financial and Compliance, Economy and
Efficiency and Program Results are discussed, as are the
benefits to be gained from effective internal review.
Chapter III describes the current status of internal
review in the Department of Defense (DOD) , identifying major




Chapter IV defines the problems of internal review in
a more classic "problem-solving" manner; and proceeds to
define alternatives, measures of effectiveness; and show
the analysis conducted.
Chapter V presents the results of the analysis, and
evaluates these results. Conclusions from these results
are presented and recommendations for improving the
effectiveness of internal review are made.
21

II. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
A. GENERAL
In order to accomplish the stated objectives of the thesis,
it is first necessary to provide the reader with definitive
background material on the history and development of the
function entitled internal review. An understanding of the
development and purposes of auditing in general, and internal
review in particular; will serve to provide the reader with
the intuitive perspective necessary to understand the various
aspects of an effective internal review program.
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to clarify,
through the use of narrative descriptions and comparisons,
the role of internal review; and its relationship to more
familiar types of auditing. Additionally, this chapter
will seek to define what internal review should be and what
it should not be, in order to provide a basis, or standard,
of measurement from which to judge the current effectiveness
of internal review within the Department of the Navy (DON)
.
"Internal review" is a relatively recent nomenclature
i
for the long established practice of organizations auditing
themselves in order to identify and correct inefficiency and
ineffectiveness in their operations and control systems.
This practice of self -inspection is more commonly described
as "internal" auditing in order to differentiate it from the
22

"external" auditing performed by entities independent of the
organization being scrutinized. Thus, the definition of
internal review relative to other forms of audit or
inspection is more one of "who conducts the audit,"
rather than the audit's substance.
To trace the beginnings of auditing, one must travel
back in time to the third millennium B.C., where
archaeologists have unearthed evidence of the preparation
of summary lists of transactions by Mesopotamian scribes,
who then compared these lists to the original lists
prepared by others. The evidence shows tiny dots, ticks
and circles on the sides of figures; which leads one to the
belief that this was the beginning of two control devices:
division of duties and systematic checking. /~ 1 2 J7
Other early civilizations such as Egyptian, Persian
and Hebrew also required the audit of one's official re_cords
by another. The Greeks preferred slaves to freemen as
auditors, believing that the statements of a slave under
torture were more trustworthy than those of a freeman under
oath. C 12 7
U.S. history provides a stark example of the need for
effective auditing and also one of the perennial ploys used
to frustrate auditors: "itemize the small expenses to
death, and lump all the big ones together." 13 J This
example is taken from Allen Schick's article "200 Years of
23

Financial Management," which appeared in the July, 1976
bicentennial edition of Armed Forces Comptroller . C 1?> J
It is paraphrased for brevity with direct quotations in-
dicated. Mr. Schick states that "War . . . has been one of
the driving forces in the upward path of federal spending."
As a prelude to a discussion of the relationship of war and
money, Mr. Schick offers as an example of the need for
effective scrutiny of public spending the following
recounting of the financial prosecution of the American
Revolution: "... it all began with a General. General
George Washington was not only first in war and first in
peace, but also first in American budgeting." When offered
a tax-free salary of approximately $6000 (in 1776 dollars)
Washington, "dedicated public servant that he was," replies
"
. . . far be it from me to accept payment in the service
of my country; just pay my expenses." When he (Washington)
submitted his expense vouchers for payment in 1883 (the
conservative estimate of the total in current dollars, is
between five and ten million dollars)
,
they included such
items as a ,"gilded coach for Martha, imported wines,
servants and a host of similar items." As to the method
of enumeration of these necessary expenses, Mr. Schick gives
the following examples which were on consecutive pages of
Washington's expense account: "Oats for mule - three and
one-half cents."; and on the next page, "Sundry and
24

Miscellaneous Expenses - $3500." It is obvious that the
Continental Congress could have used the General Accounting
Office's (GAO) assistance and "watchdog" powers from the
beginning.
One cannot state that an effective audit of General
Washington's accounts during the course of the Revolution
would have precluded the disbursement of public funds in
such a vague and perhaps doubtful manner. However, one can
assert that such an audit would have certainly discovered
the questionable items; and alerted the "authorizing body"
to the situation in a timely manner; allowing appropriate
action to be taken.
This facet of auditing, bringing questionable transactions
to the attention of responsible management, is gaining
increasing importance and emphasis today, relative to the
more traditional view of auditing which was to "certify the
validity of accounts." /Tl2:24_7 As evidence of this
transition from the "green eye-shaded bookkeeper: to the
professional auditor as an aid to management, consider the
following from a recent GAO report to the Congress C 14:1 J:
"In recent years the role of Federal internal auditing
has been the subject of widespread congressional concern,
culminating in the passage of Inspector General
legislation in 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979 which combined
the audit and investigation activities within 15 Federal
agencies for the purpose of detecting fraud, waste and
and abuse (emphasis added) . This concern was generated
by the public's demand for better Government and an end
to waste in Federal programs.
25

Federal executive agencies have offices throughout
the United States and abroad which employ nearly
5 million people and manage scores of programs.
Effective management of such operations requires a
system of internal control, including internal audit
(emphasis added) . An agency's internal audit organization
,
when given adequate staff organizational independence, and
authority to review all agency functions, can furnish
management with information, analyses, appraisals, and
recommendations for improving operations (emphasis added) .
"
Returning to the history and development of auditing,
Lawrence B. Sawyer, CIA (Certified Internal Auditor) has
stated:
"The auditing function, as we know it today, started
during the Industrial Revolution. Many commercial and
industrial organizations employed expert accountants to
examine and certify the validity of accounts. Even
Columbus, in 1492, was accompanied to America by an
auditor representing Queen Isabella." [ 12:24 J
Internal auditing in its modern context, began to
emerge as a separate discipline following the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, which made corporate management responsible fox
the accuracy of financial statements filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) . This requirement
led corporate management to hire accountants to make more
detailed verifications of accounts than the public (external)
accountants could. £ 12 J
It was not until 1941 however, that internal auditing
began to gain the prestige and trappings of a separate
profession. That year marks the formation of the Institute
of Internal Auditors, Inc. (IIA) . It was then, that internal
26

auditing "began to range beyond the books of account and
began to assume a new posture." [ 12:25 J 1941 was also,
"the year the first major book in the field, Internal
Auditing , was published." [ 15:25 _7
Victor Z. Brink, CIA, a charter member of the HA, has
recalled the formative pressures and early history of
internal auditing as a profession as follows:
"In 1941 there were quite a few Internal Auditing
departments but the number was very small in relation
to the number of organizations that needed such
services . . . There was, at that time, however, an
increasing awareness of the growing size and complexity
of all kinds of operations by business, government,
and other types of organizations.
. . . There was an increasingly common recognition
that Internal Auditing departments could make a more
important contribution to help management cope with the
emerging complexities.
. . . Typically, the existing Internal Auditing
departments reported to lower-ranking financial
executives - more often to the officer responsible for
accounting activities.
. . . 1941 was the year when a small group of
forxvard- looking internal auditors became discontented
with the visibility provided by existing professional
associations and decided that a new professional
organization should be established and dedicated
exclusively to the professional interests of internal
auditors
.
During the years following 1941, and especially
after World War II, a number of interrelated forces
were at work . . . continuing expansion of the size
and complexity of business corporations, governmental
bodies, and philanthropic organizations. Business
corporations were also becoming increasingly




The result was additional concerns on the part of
management . . . and a related effort to expand and
upgrade internal auditing groups. Management also
became increasingly aware of getting more benefits from
the substantial amounts of money expended to maintain
internal auditors and, therefore, was motivated to use
them to help solve broader operational problems.
At the same time, internal auditors became
increasingly aware of their opportunities to go beyond
the narrower protective role and to make more
substantial and dynamic contributions to management's
welfare. . . This new emphasis of internal auditors,
expanding their traditional financial auditing role,
came to be known as 'operational auditing'." O 15: 25-26 J
Since 1941, internal auditing as a profession has grown
and matured, while expanding its role in serving a wide
range of organizational needs, expecially operational
activities. This development can be traced by referring to
the profession's own Statements of Responsibilities of the
Internal Auditor, as promulgated by the HA.
The original 1947 Statement stated that internal
auditing "deals primarily with accounting matters but may
properly deal with matters of an operating nature." /7 12:25 J7
The revised 1957 Statement expended the role of the
internal auditor somewhat by stating that internal auditing
provides for "the review of accounting financial, and other
operations." ZT 12:25 J
The 1971 Statement described internal auditing as "the
review of operations as a service to management." £ 12:2S J
This served to remove the internal auditor from the tie to




In 1978, the internal auditor's role was expanded
further by the revision of the 1971 description from
"service to management" to the more encompassing "service
to the organization." This revision was promulgated by
the IIA's Standards for the Professional Practice of
Internal Auditing and expanded the service of the internal
auditor to the board of directors as well as to management.
£"12:25 J
This 1978 revision portends much more than is at first
obvious. As will be shown later in this thesis, the
extension of internal auditing' s role and service to a higher
echelon than operating management, can be a causal factor
in reducing both the use and effectiveness of internal
auditing to operating management. This expansion however,
in the view of some students of bureaucracy such as
W. J. Haga, Phd, is (was) inevitable; and will (has) led
to the formation of yet another organizational entity to
perform the duties and functions once performed by internal
auditing. This quirk of bureaucracy, described by
Dr. W. J. Haga in his book, HAGA'S LAW as the "Spin-off
Corollary," has had the effect of creating the need for such
an entity of function. The organizational function which




A description of the function and objective of effective
internal auditing with respect to operating management is
outlined by the IIA's latest Statement of Responsibilities
of Internal Auditors which states:
"The objective of internal auditing is to assist all
members of management in the effective discharge of
their responsibilities by furnishing them with analyses,
appraisals, recommendations and pertinent comments
concerning the activities reviewed. Internal auditors
are concerned with any phase of business activity in
which they may be of service to management. This
involves going beyond the accounting and financial
records to obtain a full understanding of the operations
under review. The attainment of this overall objective
involves such activities as:
"Reviewing and appraising the soundness, adequacy,
and application of accounting, financial and other
operating controls, and promoting effective control
at reasonable cost.
"Ascertaining the extent of compliance with
established policies, plans, and procedures.
'Ascertaining the extent to which company assets are
accounted for and safeguarded from losses of all
kinds.
'Ascertaining the reliability of management data
developed within the organization.
'Appraising the quality of performance in carrying
out assigned responsibilities.
'Recommending operating improvements . " C 15:27 J
This chapter has thus far traced both the need and
development of auditing in general, and internal auditing
in particular, from ancient times to the present. It has
been shown that the need for independent verification and
appraisal of financial operations dates from the earliest
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business activities. It may be stated, that the need for
auditing originated the first time a business endeavor
expanded beyond the capability of the owner/manager to
personally supervise or record all transactions.
It has also been shown, that the development of
internal auditing closely parallels the expansion of
business enterprises into more complex endeavors and
geographically separated locations. This expansion of
operations taxed the capabilities of operational management,
and led to more and more reliance by management on the
advisory and investigative capacities of internal auditing.
It may be postulated at this point, that the forces
which drive this increased complexity and scope of operations,
such as multi-national governmental regulations and
perplexing global economics, will neither moderate nor
diminish in the foreseeable future. If history repeats",
this will probably have the effect of increasing management's
reliance upon, and hence the importance of internal auditing
as an aid to effective and efficient operations. This
presumption underscores the essentiality of educating line
management in the benefits of internal auditing; and of




Accordingly, this chapter will continue with the
objective of providing definitive material concerning the
types and levels of audit, and the benefits and requirements
for effective internal audit or review.
B. TYPES OF AUDIT
1. General
There are numerous definitions of the term
"auditing," from the general dictionary description to the
specific definition applied to a particular audit program or
engagement. Each definition has its place, depending upon
the usage of the term. The following definitions have been
selected in order to provide the reader with a general
knowledge of the term, and with a sense of perspective as to
the widespread use of the term.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977 edition)
defines "audit" as: "(a) a formal or official examination
and verification of an account book, (b) a methodical
examination and review."
The American Accounting Association (AAA) defines
auditing as,
"a systematic process of objectively obtaining and
evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic
actions and events to ascertain the degree of
correspondence between those assertions and established




The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) in its Statements on Auditing Standards
No. 1 (1973) describes financial audit as:
"The objective of the ordinary examination of financial
statements by the independent auditor is the expression
of an opinion on the fairness with which they present
financial position, results of (financial) operations
and changes in financial position in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles. The auditor's
report is the medium through which he expresses his
opinion or, if circumstances require, disclaims an
opinion. In either case, he states whether his examination




The Institute of Internal Auditors (HA) in its
Statement of Standards for the Professionsl Practice of
Internal Auditing issued in 1978 describes internal auditing
as follows:
"Internal auditing is an independent appraisal function
established within an organization to examine and
evaluate its activities as a service to the organization.
The objective of internal auditing is to assist members
of the organization in the effective discharge of their
responsibilities. To this end, internal auditing
furnishes them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations,
counsel, and information concerning the activities
reviewed." ZTl6:8_7
2 . Public Sector
a. General
The above definitions are primarily designed
and aimed at the practice of auditing in the private sector
of the economy. In the public sector, the first definitive
authority is the GAO.
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The GAO has defined auditing as follows:
"The term Audit is used to describe not only work done
by accountants in examining financial reports but also
work done in reviewing (a) compliance with applicable
laws and regulations, (b) efficiency and economy of
operations, and (c) effectiveness in achieving program
results." 17:37
b. Three Basic Types
The GAO further deliniates the three types of
audit stated above as follows:
"(1) Financial and Compliance - determines (a) whether
financial operations are properly conducted, (b) whether
the financial reports of an audited entity are presented
fairly, and (c) whether the entity has complied with
applicable laws and regulations.
"(2) Economy and Efficiency - determines whether the
entity is managing or utilizing its resources (personnel,
property, space and so forth) in an economical and
efficient manner and the causes of any inefficiencies
or uneconomical practices, including inefficiencies in
management information systems, administrative procedures,
or organizational structure.
"(3) Program Results - determines whether the desired
benefits are being achieved, whether the objectives
_
established by the legislative or other authorizing
body are being met, and whether the agency has considered
alternatives which might yield desired results at a lower
cost." ZT17:2_7
c. Other Types
A review of professional auditing literature
reveals a multitude of other terminology which superficially
suggests the existence of additional types of auditing. A
more in-depth study however, discloses that such terms as
"Management Audit," "Operational Audit," "Management Services
Audit" and "Activity Audit" are in actuality only extensions,
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refinements or combinations of the three types of auditing
defined above. For example, the term "Operational Audit"
as used most frequently, refers to the review of operating
controls and procedures to evaluate the efficiency and to
some extent the effectiveness of operations. A definition
of "Operational Audit" has been stated as follows:
"The term 'operational audit' refers to appraisals of
the administrative controls over activities other than
those included in accounting and financial audits. For
example, some of the activities regularly covered by
operational audits are: purchasing, receiving, shipping,
traffic, stores, personnel, office services, production
control, engineering, quality control, insurance,
advertising, and marketing.
The internal auditor's objectives are based on the
needs of management he serves. These needs may be
summarized as follows:
Top management needs:
-assurance that its plans (as set forth in
statements of objectives, programs, budgets, and
policies) are comprehensive, consistent, and
understood at the operating levels.
-objective information on how well its plans and
policies are being carried out at the operating levels.
-reassurance that all operating reports can be relied
on as a basis for action.
Operating management needs:
-information on weaknesses in administrative controls,
particularly as to possible sources of waste.
-aid in measuring the efficiency of operations by
feedback of information on the quality and cost of the
work and adherance to schedule.
In attempting to meet these managerial needs, the
internal auditor samples the work performed to see whether
it is in accordance with approved procedures. He verifies
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the accuracy and consistency of the information contained
in the operating reports and he studies the format of
these reports to determine whether the information is
presented in a meaningful form.
Above all, the internal auditor is alert for
indication of sources of waste and opportunities for
improvement. The auditor's traditional protective
responsibility for seeing that the company's needs are
safeguarded against loss, . . . , has new become more
broadly interpreted as a constructive responsibility for
providing protection against waste of many kinds, and in
general to help management operate effectively and
profitably." O 18 : 832-833 J
As shown by the description of "operational
auditing" presented above, the term in actuality encompasses
elements of the "economy and efficiency" and "program
results" audits defined previously. The other terms
mentioned above can also be shown to be special cases or
combinations of the three basic types of auditing defined
by the GAO.
The three basic types of auditing can perhaps
be best understood by studying the basic objectives and
purposes of each, which are summarized below,
d. Financial and Compliance
The "financial and compliance" audit focuses on
the financial reports of an organization which leave that
organization and are used by higher echelons or other
interested parties (such as the stockholders of a corporation
or the SEC) . The financial operations and recordkeeping
necessary for the compilation of these reports are
scrutinized by the auditor to enable an attestation as to
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their fair presentation of the organization's financial
position. In conducting this type of audit, the auditor
is interested in not only the accuracy of the records but
also the consistent compliance of the recordkeeping
procedures to applicable laws, regulations, principles and
policies. The auditor, in contrast, is not particularly
interested in better ways of accomplishing the organization's
objectives, unless of course, sufficient waste exists to
effectively border on fraud.
The auditor, in a financial and compliance
audit, is seeking only to attest to the fair presentation
of the organization's financial reports. If transactions
are recorded correctly and completely, properly summarized
and presented in a clear, consistent manner; the requisites
for attestation have been met and the auditor may then
express an opinion in that regard.
e. Economy and Efficiency
In an "economy and efficiency" audit, the
auditor focuses on the organization's use of resources.
While ensuring compliance with applicable laws, principles,
etc., the auditor's main thrust is on the relationship of
resources to output which is the definition of efficiency. C%U
The auditor's objective is to provide management with a
determination as to the relative efficiency of operations
when compared to some industry standard, in-house objective
or mathmatically determined optimal level.
37

The auditor must consider and review all
areas which impact on the production of the organization's
output. The GAO recognized this when it included management
information systems, administrative procedures and
organizational structure in its definition of an "economy
and efficiency" audit. In short, in this type of audit,
the auditor strives to provide management with a status
report on the efficiency of its operations and with
recommendations for improvement. The goals and objectives
of the organization are usually taken as given; and are
normally reviewed only as a basis for determining what the
resources used should be compared against. The bottom
line is an attempt, through careful systematic analysis,
to minimize the ratio of resources consumed to outputs
produced.
f. Program Results
In the "program results" audit, the auditor must
take a strategic (as opposed to operational) viewpoint. The
auditor reviews the organization's operations from the
standpoint of whether the goals and objectives established
by the legislative or authorizing body are being met by the
organizations' outputs. By definition, this could be
referred to as an "effectiveness" audit. [ 8 J The auditor
is less concerned with the routine operations of the
organization, and interested mainly with the relationship of
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the final output of the organization to the stated goals
and objectives. The auditor must determine the outputs
and objectives, and through analysis determine if the
desired results are being achieved. During the course of
this analysis, the auditor must evaluate other alternative
means of accomplishing the desired results and even go so
far as to evaluate the need for the organization at all.
This facet of "program results" auditing has been stated
by Anthony and Herzlinger as:
"We are here concerned not with evaluations of specific
aspects of a program, but rather with the broad evaluation
of a program as a whole, particularly of those programs
whose continued existence is optional. If these programs
are not effective, they should be discontinued, or at
least redirected." ZT 8 : 521 J
Anthony and Herzlinger continue by providing
insight into the history and scope of "program results"
auditing:
"At the federal level, legislation requiring oversight
of programs has been in effect since 1946. The scope
of formal evaluation efforts was greatly enlarged in the
early 1970' s when the federal government delegated to
the states the task of providing most social services
and required as a condition of funding these programs
that a formal means of evaluating them be established.
At about the same time, there was widespread interest
in 'sunset legislation' - laws that provided for the
automatic discontinuance of a program unless it was
evaluated every six to eight years and found to be
effective (emphasis added). As of 1977, 23 states had
enacted some form of sunset law, ..." ^7 8 : 5 2 1 _7
3. Summary
In summary, this section has defined auditing and
described the three basic types. These types of auditing
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have been defined and explained from the viewpoint of the
auditor; and their affect on the auditors focus discussed.
This section has provided the reader with a basic knowledge
of the purpose of auditing and the several ways it can be
used by management, or management's superiors, to gain
knowledge about the financial condition, efficiency, and
effectiveness of operations. The terminology used to
describe and differentiate the originating authority and
ultimate user of audit information is discussed in the next
section under the heading, "Levels of Audit."
C. LEVELS OF AUDIT
1 . General
This section will discuss the subject of auditing
from the standpoint of organizational position. The
viewpoint used will mostly be that of the DON local or field
activity commander, commanding officer or of f icer-in-charge
.
Parallels will be drawn whenever possible, to the private
sector in order to provide the reader with additional
insight and understanding.
To properly understand the term "level," one must
first comprehend the applicable organizational hierarchy.
The local DON commander, commanding officer or officer- in-
charge will be loosely equated in this thesis to the head
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of the Chevrolet division of General Motors (GM) . This will
provide the reader with a private sector reference point from
which to compare and contrast the various organizations
mentioned.
As shown in figure II-l, the head of the Chevrolet
division reports ultimately to the president of GM. This
can be equated, as shown in figure II-l, to the local DON
commanding officer reporting through the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) , to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
.
Each of these "chief executives" is ultimately responsible
to the "owners" of the entity. In GM's case, it is the
stockholders of the corporation; and in the USN it is the
general public, or the taxpayers. Positioned, in a
regulatory sense, "between" the "owners" and the "chief
executive" are the regulatory oversight entities of Congress
and the SEC. While the analogy is not exact, it serves to
illustrate the "external" nature of the first level of audit
to be discussed.
2 . External Auditing
a. Private Sector
In the private sector, an "external" audit is
performed on a corporation or division of a corporation by
an independent Certified Public Accountant (CPA) . This
DPA is truly independent of the audited entity; and provides
any report generated to someone higher in the organizational
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hierarchy than the "chief executive." In the case of GM,
the auditors' report would normally be addressed to the
board of directors and stockholders, with a copy submitted
to the SEC as required by the Securities Exchange Act, as
amended. Thus, the "external" nature of the audit is upheld
from inception to conclusion.
b. DON
In the DON, an "external" audit is perhaps best
characterized by the audit of a local command or field
activity by the GAO. The GAO auditor is totally independent
of the DON; and the GAO audit report is submitted to Congress
Unless the report is classified, it is available free to the
general public upon their request. Other examples of
"external" audit in the DON, are audits by Department of
Defense (DOD) agencies such as the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Audit Service (DAS) . As in
the private sector example, the externality of the audit is
complete.
3 . Internal Auditing
a. General
Organizationally located in a staff position
to the "chief executive" is an "internal" audit function.
In the USN, this function is performed by NAVAUDSVC under




The designation "internal" comes from the organizational
location of the function within an organization as opposed
to the external CPA or GAO auditor.
The HA has described internal auditing as:
"An independent appraisal function extablished within
an organization (emphasis added) . to examine ancT"
evaluate its activities as a service to management. It
is a managerial control which functions by measuring
and evaluating the effectiveness of other controls."
(Duties of the Internal Auditor, 1957)
Lawrence B. Sawyer offers a further definition
of internal auditing which addresses the internal auditor's
opportunities as well as responsibilities, representing a
"top-down" management oriented approach. This definition
also has equal applicability to internal review with respect
to its opportunities and responsibilities.
"Internal auditing is the independent appraisal of the
various operations and systems of control within an
organization to determine whether acceptable policies
and procedures are followed, established standards are
met, resources are used efficiently and economically,
planned missions are accomplished effectively, and the
organization's objectives are being achieved." £ 12 :26 J
Internal auditing may be distinguished from
external auditing by its degree of independence, its focus,
its location internal to the organization, and its main
responsibilities. In the public sector, GAO has clarified
these differences as follows
:
"Although there are numerous areas of common interest
between the General Accounting Office and an agency's
internal auditors, certain basic objectives and
responsibilities differ. Internal auditing is an
integral part of the agency's system of management
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control. In its audits, the General Accounting Office
is concerned with the entire control mechanism within
an agency, including the various arrangements made by
the management for internal audits and other forms of
inspection, appraisal and evaluation. If warranted
by its evaluations, the General Accounting Office will
rely on such work and make full use of it in conducting
its examinations." £~19:264_7
b. Authority
The authority for internal auditing in the
DON is provided by the National Security Act Amendments
of 1949 and The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
1950, also known as the Accounting and Auditing Act of
1950. The first required the Secretary of the Navy to
organize and conduct internal audit in a manner consistent
with the operations of the Office of the Comptroller of the
DOD. £~20:19_7 The second required each Government agency
to establish and maintain systems of internal control,
including internal audit. £"14:1.7
c. Purpose
The purpose of internal auditing in the DON
has been stated by SECNAV as:
"Internal audit in the Department of the Navy, under
the responsibility of the NAVAUDSVC, is the independent
evaluation of programs, activities, systems, procedures,
and other operations involving the expenditure of funds,
utilization of resources, or accomplishment of management
objectives. The purpose of audit is to provide service
to management at all levels through the objective
performance of independent evaluations to determine the
adequacy and effectiveness of practices, procedures, and
controls. This is accomplished through objectively
reporting results of audits, making constructive
recommendations, and providing consultation while





The internal audit function in the DON is under
the direction of the AUDGEN who serves as the staff
assistant for audit matters to the Under Secretary of the
Navy (UNSECNAV) , The AUDGEN also receives technical
guidance and supervision from the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Financial Management) (ASN(FM)). £~21:1-4J7
The NAVAUDSVC is comprised of a Headquarters
activity and four regional offices. Each regional office
is assigned a geographic area, and is responsible to the
Director, NAVAUDSVC for the planning, supervision, conduct
and review of all internal audits in their area. ZT 2 1 : 1 - 4 J7
e. Concentration
The main focus of audit attention by the
NAVAUDSVC is on those functions which are of primary concern
to management from the local commander through the SECNAV.
£21:1-5.7 It is SECNAV policy that the primary
concentration of audit effort will be on the functions most
directly involved in accomplishing the activity's mission;
and the extent to which other functions are examined depends
on their support of mission performance or specific interest
indicated by the activity or higher authority. £~21:l-5_7
Other functions which are usually audited on a routine basis
are disbursing, commissary stores, and Morale, Welfare and
Recreation (MWR) fund activities. /~21:l-5_7
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Although the stated purpose of internal auditing
in the DON is "to provide service to management at all levels,"
£"21:1-4 J it should be noted that, except for certain
"Management Consulting Services," C 21:1-8 J the audit report
generated by a NAVAUDSVC audit is distributed outside of
the local activity, and can be provided to GAO. Z7 21 * ^ ~ 8 J7
4 . Internal Review
a. General
As stated previously, internal review is
differentiated from internal auditing not so much by its
substance as by the perspective from which it is viewed.
Internal review is normally associated with an in-house
capability at the lower echelon or activity level. £"11:118_7
In its formal implementation of the internal
review function in the DON, SECNAVINST 7510.8 dated
15 October 1975 entitled: "Internal Review in the Department
of the Navy" defined internal review as follows:
"The conducting of special audits, analysis and
investigations of financial operations and the use of
command resources to detect difficiencies , improprieties
and inefficiencies, and to provide recommendations in
order to correct conditions that adversely impact on
financial management, mission accomplishment, or the
integrity of the command."
The above definition is an extension of the
previously assigned functions of internal review, which
were specified in the Navy Comptroller Manual Volume I as:
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1. special studies, analyses and investigations of
comptroller areas;
2. audits of nonappropriated funds;
3. assisting in correcting deficiencies revealed by-
internal audit;
4. participating in the installation of financial and
accounting systems;
5. developing financial programs, procedures and
controls
;
6. advising on organization and staffing in comptroller
areas
;
7. maintaining liaison with the Naval Audit Service;
8. annual reviews of civilian timekeeping and payroll
function.
Thus, although encompassing as wide a scope
and jurisdiction as internal auditing, internal review
refers to an audit/review function strictly within the
organizational structure and management framework of a
specific suborganizational entity or activity such as the
production department of a corporation, or a Naval Station.
The Comptroller of the Navy has further
clarified the distinction between internal review and internal
auditing; and provided the key to internal review's value
by stating:
"internal review is a function performed within a
command, at the direction of the head of that command or
in pursuance of a plan approved by him, the results of




The authority for internal review in the DON is
derived from DOD Instruction (DODINST) 7600.2 dated
7 August 1978 entitled: "Audit Policies," and DODINST 7600.3
dated 4 January 1974 entitled: "Internal Audit in the
Department of Defense."
A good overview of this authority is provided
by The Task Force on Evaluation of Audit, Inspection and
Investigative Components of the Department of Defense report
dated May 1, 1980 which states:
"Department of Defense regulations provide that 'within
the Military Departments . . . (all internal auditing)
will be carried out by a single audit organization'
(Department of Defense Directive 7600.2), and that internal
review does 'not constitute internal audit as prescribed
herein . . .' (Department of Defense instruction 7600.3).
Instead, internal review is relegated to a far more
limited role:
'Management of lower echelons is not
establishing groups which, while not
independent or comprehensive audits,
'trouble shooters' who may make spec
comptroller and other areas and assi
deficiencies which are revealed by a
analyses, observations or other mean
authorizing such internal review act
echelon, care should be exercised to
avoidance of duplication of internal














Aside from the limited provisions of Department of
Defense Directive 7600.2 and Department of Defense
Instruction 7600.3, which have been quoted above, there
is no Department of Defense-level regulatory guidance
outlining the role or latitude of internal review,





The purpose of internal review in the DON has-
been stated by the SECNAV as follows:
"The Internal Review function is designed to provide
Commanders, Commanding Officers, and Comptrollers with
an independent in-house capability for review of
financial and other resources, related analysis and
trouble shooting, and the discharge of assigned audit
responsibilities . . . The objective of the Internal
Review function is to aid the Commander, Commanding
Officer or Comptroller in their role as funds
administrators by assessing the fidelity with which
prescribed procedures are being followed for the
accounting and expenditure of appropriated and non-
appropriated funds. Thus, priority attention should be
given to those areas where operating conditions of
financial complexity may be a factor in overexpenditure
or inefficiency in operations; or in obscuring
misapplications of funds, fraud or theft." £"10:1-2.7
d. Organization
The organizational location of internal has
been defined by SECNAV as follows:
"... the Internal Review function should be
organizationally placed in a staff capacity to the
Comptroller or such other official who may be assigned
responsibility for administration of funds. However,
should circumstances so warrant, the organizational
placement of the Internal Review function should not
preclude direct liaison with the Commander or Commanding
Officer." ClO-.lJ
e. Concentration
Aside from the caution that, "care should be
exercised to assure avoidance of duplication of internal
audit functions . . . which are assigned to the centralized
audit organizations" which is contained in DODINST 7600.3
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referenced above, the areas open to internal review are
basically not restricted according to the SECNAV
definition of internal review cited previously.
Enclosure (1) to SECNAVINST 7510.8,
referenced earlier as the formal implementing instruction
in the USN, defines internal review and provides the
following amplifying list of functional elements:
"... Internal Review is responsible for examining
internal management controls, practices and
procedures at all levels to determine adequacy in
concept and effectiveness in application. Further,
it insures that there is provision for financial
integrity and effective utilization of all
available command resources. In addition and
where applicable, the Internal Review function
includes
:
a. Auditing of the civilian timekeeping and
payroll function (NAVCOMPT Instruction 7540. 4A),
and certain nonappropriated fund activities
(NAVCOMPT instruction 7540. 5A).
b. Monitoring the correction of deficiencies
which are revealed by the Naval Audit Service,
GAO or by other external reports, analyses or
observations
.
c. Monitoring and critiqueing the design and
installation of financial and accounting systems
and procedures, with emphasis upon the identification
and use of valid audit trails and other management
controls
.
d. Providing advice and reviewing the use of
quality control and other indicators that routinely
gauge the effectiveness of financial management
and utilization of command resources.
e. Designing and applying check lists for internal
review of areas that are considered unique or
critical to local command in the safeguarding of
resources; for example, the areas of (1) physical
security, (2) ADP security, or (3) to present/detect
theft or fraud involving government resources.
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f. Reviewing safeguards or refinements to existing
controls for material and financial accountability.
g. At random occasions, reviewing the proper
execution of various directed programs such as
(1) cost reduction, (2) financial reports generated
by or for the activity, and (3) physical inventory
and reconcilation.
h. Participating in, from time to time, reviews
of other problem areas, as directed.
i. Rendering advice on matters of organization
and staffing within Comptroller areas.
j . Maintaining liaison with and providing
assistance to auditors of the Naval Audit Service
assigned to perform continuous, periodic or integrated
audits; providing similar liaison and assistance where
appropriate to other audit or inspector
representatives such as the General Accounting Office,
Inspector General, Command Inspections, etc." C^J
In short, the internal review function is a
powerful management control device available for use at
the discretion of the local commander or commanding officer.
Internal review also serves in an advisory capacity to line
management as required,
f. Summary
This section has defined internal review, stated
its purpose in the DON and described its decentralized
organization. The section has also distilled the authority
for internal review in the DON: and shown, through references,
the lack of guidance concerning the role and latitude of
internal review. Also provided, was an overview of the
function internal review has been assigned in the DON.
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Prior to describing the benefits to be gained
from internal review, it is advantageous to repeat the
NAVCOMPT description of internal review which provides the
key to internal review's value to the local commander or
commanding officer:
"Internal review is a function performed within a
command
,
at the direction of the head of that command
or in pursuance of a plan approved by him, the results
of which are reported to him." (emphasis added) £""22:2-2 J
D. BENEFITS OF INTERNAL REVIEW
1. General
The benefits to be gained from effective internal
review have been summarized by The Task Force on Evaluation
of Audit, Inspection and Investigative Components of the
Department of Defense report dated 1 May 1980 as follows:
"Internal review is an especially valuable management
tool in that it combines the responsiveness, ready
availability and independence of inspectors general
with the special analytical skills of internal auditors.
Thus, it provides an internal control mechanism that
the commander cannot duplicate with any of his other
staff resources. Internal review is also invaluable
to the local commander because it focuses soley upon
the command's problems, leaving broader, . . .
(Department-wide) matters to the internal auditors
and senior echelon inspectors general. Finally,
internal review enables the commander to call for
audit assistance without simultaneously announcing
his problems to the world." £"11:152_7
2. Characteristics of Internal Review
From the above summarization and the professional
literature which produced the list of benefits presented in
Chapter I, it is possible to distill a list of the salient
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characteristics of internal review. These characteristics
combine to yield benefits and also to serve as the key to
acceptance and effective use of internal review by line
management.
The characteristics will be listed and briefly
described below in order to provide the reader with the
proper semantics for future reference in this thesis. The
descriptions are distilled from numerous professional
articles and reports, and from textbooks on the subjects of
accounting and auditing. Two particularly valuable
references for the peculiar "organizational processes" and
"Bureaucratic politics" viewpoint of internal review were
The Task Force on Evaluation of Audit Inspection and
Investigative Components of the Department of Defense
Report f 11 J , and the NAVAUDSVC review of the DOM's internal
review program. £~ 9 J7
a. Responsive
In this thesis, the term responsive refers
to both the willingness and capacity to accommodate the
desires and needs of the local commander. It does not
refer to the ability, technical or otherwise, to perform
the requirements of a task. It does however, refer to the
intangible elements of motivation and organizational
orientation, and to the tangible limitations of available






This term refers to the accessibility of the
function to the local commander. It refers to the ease
with which the local commander can communicate with the
personnel performing the function and vice versa.
c. Independent
Independent, in this context, refers not only
to the usual interpretation of the term as "being free from
control of others," C 23:584 J but also to the appearance
of being free. It also refers to the relationship of
organizations, and to the source of authority and
reporting responsibilities. This last nuance is linked to
the characteristic of obtaining "assistance without
advertising problems" discussed below; and together, they
may be a strong influence on the local commander.
d. Analytically Skilled
This term refers to the usual training and
experience auditors in general receive in analytical
techniques such as ratio and trend analysis, applied
statistics, regression analysis, etc.
e. Unduplicatible Internal Control Mechanism
This term refers to the use of internal
review as a management control and its definition as
internal control (see previous definitions) . The
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adjective "unduplicatible" refers to the necessity for the
function to be performed in its entirity and possess all of
the characteristics listed herein for it to be effective.
Concerning this facet of internal review, The
Task Force on Evaluation of Audit, Inspection and Inves-
tigative Components of the Department of Defense stated:
"Thus, the vast majority of duties currently undertaken
by internal review personnel could not be performed
by a centralized internal audit organization and, (if
consolidated) , the local commander would be forced
to devote other staff resources to the internal review
effort." £"11:140.7
This supports the view that the function
performed by internal review cannot be performed in its
entirity, or even in its majority, by centralized audit
organizations; and, if consolidated, other additional
resources would be required to "duplicate" the function,
f. Sole Focus On Local Command's Problems
This characteristic refers to the undilution
of the focus and attention of a local command's internal
review function. The function is local in viewpoint and
responsible only for areas unique to the local command,
or only for segments of a broader area which directly
affect the local command. It also refers to the increased
likelihood that an inquiry will "focus on the local
commander's precise concerns rather than the auditor's own
judgement's regarding the wisdom, scope, location, timing
and purpose of the audit." £" 11: 149 J
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g. Assistance Without Advertising Problems
This characteristic is mostly self-explanatory,
but one should not interpret the implicit meaning in the
context of a "cover-up." Rather, one should construe
this characteristic as providing the local commander the
ability to identify and correct problem areas without
being subjected to additional scrutiny and criticism as
a consequence of those efforts. £"ll:151J7
h. Flexible
This term refers to the ability of a local
function to shift emphasis or reorder plans as the results
of new developments. In this manner, it is related to
the characteristic of responsiveness described above.
An additional connotation, is the ability of the internal
review function to conduct audits or reviews of areas that
are not financial in nature, such as mission operations,
i. Streamlines Other Audit Effort
This characteristic refers to the ability of
internal and external auditors to "build on" the work of
the internal review function, rather than duplicating the
work. In general, this would help to reduce the amount
of time required to perform internal or external audits;
thus reducing the interpretations to local commands. Of
course, the internal or external auditors would have to
be satisfied as to the extent and reliability of internal
review prior to accepting it.
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j . Provides For Corporate Knowledge
This characteristic refers to the construction,
over time, of a repository of information, experience and
knowledge concerning the local command's unique history,
operations and problems. This ability stems from serving
as the command's focal point for liaison with outside
inspectors and auditors; and also from the fact that
approximately 98 percent of the full-time internal review
personnel in the DON are civilian personnel. £" 9 : 2 J Since
civilian personnel tend to remain in one location longer
than their military counterparts, their penchant for
assimilating and retaining data unique to the local command
is greater. This fact, coupled with the wide range of
internal review activities and interests, combine to provide
the local commander with an information storehouse of
obvious management value.
k. Solution Oriented
This characteristic refers to the perception
and recurring criticism of outside auditors by commanders
and commanding officers that:
"... many (internal) auditors seemed to dwell on
finding and reporting deficiencies rather than
determining solutions, and seldom made positive
comments on portions of operations found to be
satisfactory . . . Managers often believed they
had a better method to correct the deficiency than
was recommended by the auditors, but felt that the




Since the internal review function works for
the commander, the inquiry is more likely to focus on his
or her precise concerns and, of necessity, dwell on
solutions to the problems in order to recommend same to
the commander. £" 11:149 J
3 . Benefits of Internal Review
The benefits to be derived from the effective
application of internal review are a function of the
characteristics described in the previous section. In
order to properly understand the internal review function
and also why the similar characteristics of internal
auditing do not produce the same benefits, the reader
should possess some knowledge of bureaucracy. The reader
should also understand two models of decision making
described by Graham T. Allison as the "Organizational
Process Model" and the "Bureaucratic Politics Model."
£"24:274J
Robert P. Haffa, Jr. has summarized these two
models in his article "Allison's Models: An Analytic
Approach to Bureaucratic Politics" as follows:
"The key to understanding . . . (Allison's Models)
... is contained in Allison's thesis. He states
that explanations, predictions, and evaluations of
policy decisions are significantly influenced by the
Viewpoint of the analyst . ZT25:224_7
. . . This model (Organizational Process) assumes
that policy decisions can be better understood as
outputs of large organizations rather than as
rationale choices of single actors. The federal
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government is more like a mosaic than a monolith; it
is 'conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied
organizations, each with its own interst.' But these
organizations, as the nation itself, are not of a
single mind. Thus the United States Air Force is a
component organization of the national government, but
it is 'an agglomeration of commands, forces, and staffs,
each with its own institutional interests and goals,
its own identity and memory.' £~25:225_7
. . . According to Allison's third model
(Bureaucratic Politics), governmental decisions can
be analyzed as outcomes of bargaining games. This
model does not visualize a unitary actor, neither in
the form of a nation-state nor in the organizations
that compose the government. Model III concentrates
instead on the human actors, the players that are
engaged in a contest of influence and compromise.
Thus decision making becomes a bargaining process,
and policy emerges as a political outcome (emphasis
added)
.
The essence of the Bureaucratic Politics Model
is its emphasis on people.
. . . An analyst utilizing Model III . . . would
concentrate on the political struggles and
bureaucratic maneuvering . . . the politics of
discovering, the politics of issues and the politics of
choice." /T25:2257
The purpose of the above discussion was to emphasize
the parochial significance of the organizational location
or position of the internal review function. The mission
of internal review:
".
. .to augment the commander'
s
(emphasis added)
ability to detect problem areas and to respond
immediately to warning indicators within a command
(emphasis added) by performing evaluation of command
programs, procedures and operations, especially those
related to expenditures of funds, use of resources and




is thus materially affected by the organizational position
or location of the function itself. The location of the
function has direct bearing, as shown by Allison, et. al
.
,
on the viewpoints and attitudes of not only the purveyors
of the service (the auditors) but also the recipients and
users of the service (the local commanders)
.
This difference in viewpoints and attitudes is
perhaps best illustrated by several findings of The Task
Force on Evaluation of Audit, Inspection and Investigative
Components of the Department of Defense which state in
part £"11:1457:
"We disagree with the . . . proposal to merge . . .
(internal review and internal audit) because commanders
are becoming increasingly reluctant to solicit audit
assistance from their respective internal audit
agencies. In this respect, we are in agreement with
an earlier study which:
'found that the commanders at Air Force bases
visited generally considered the resident Air Force
Audit Agnecy auditors as external (emphasis added)
and preferred to provide for '. '. . (internal review)
in-house. Hence, request audits at the base level
(USAF's equivalent of USN internal review) were
relatively infrequent.' (Joint Department of Defense
Study, Report of Survey of Utilization of Internal
Review Personnal in the Department of Defense and
Relationship to Internal Audit Function, August 16, 1967)
. . . the Air Force Audit Agency's 'policy is to
be responsive to commanders' problems, but (to) be
selective in evaluating CAP (Commander's Audit Program)
requests. (Air Force Audit Agency Regulation
175-110, Ch. 65-2 (h) , October 31, 1979)
... In this respect, . . . several of the Air
Force auditors interviewed . . . stressed their
selectivity in undertaking command request audits and
indicated that they declined to provide requested
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audit assistance whenever the problem area identified
by the (local) commander did not 'merit' audit
attention.
The above findings and statements show that, from
the viewpoint of the local commander, an internal audit
agency is regarded as being external; and thus available
services are only reluctantly requested. Also, the
attitude of the internal audit agency tends to remain that
of a separate entity with broader objectives, even when
requested to perform internal review functions as a portion
of assigned responsibilities.
This section has thus far presented the reader
with data from which to develop an understanding of the
tacit importance of the location or organizational
position of the internal review function. As demonstrated
by The Task Force on Evaluation of Audit, Inspection and
Investigative Components of the Department of Defense,
locating the internal review function outside of the local
command tends to produce the situation where internal
review services are reluctantly requested and reluctantly
provided. £ 11:145 J
The reader should bear this tendency in mind, as
well as the dictums of the organization process and
bureaucratic politics models of decision making presented




a. Internal review is a strong flexible management
control tool of basically unlimited local scope,
the use of which is at the discretion of the local
commander. As shown by the previous discussion, the
flexibility and discretionary nature of internal review
is dependent in part, upon the organizational position
of the function itself. In order to provide
management control, as defined by Anthony, et. al. ZT 8 : 3 J7 ,
the function by definition, must be under the direction
of the local commander in his or her role as funds
administrator or resources manager." /7 10:2.7
b. Internal review is responsible directly to line
management, not to outside agencies. Herein lies
perhaps the most important facet of internal review.
It is a benefit in the sense it provides the local
commander with an investigative, problem-solving tool;
and a characteristic in the sense of providing the
local commander with such a tool without opening
the command, and thus the commander personally, up to
additional scrutiny and criticism. £ 11 : 149-151 J In
order to completely comprehend the significance of
this trait, one must consider the environment in
which the local commander operates and also the
implications of the bureaucratic politics model of
decision making. The environment has been
characterized not only by the quotations presented
in Chapter I of this thesis but also by The Task Force
on Evaluation of Audit, Inspection and Investigative
Components of the Department of Defense as follows:
"Throughout the military departments, and to an
extent not found in civil agencies, decision-making
authority and corresponding accountability for
failure (emphasis added) is assigned to commanders
at every level. This accountability is magnified
by the fact that the individual commander's
responsibilities go well beyond those directly
associated with the state of training, discipline
and operational readiness of the unit's personnel
and equipment.
The commanders of bases, installations,
industrial activities and separate commands are
solely responsible (emphasis added) for all
(emphasis added) of the support facilities
required to operate and sustain their command.
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. . . To meet the foregoing responsibilities
commanders need local and immediately available audit
assistance . . ."£"11:119-121^7
The fact that the environment of accountability is
real and on a personal level to the local commander,
forces the local commander to conform to the
bureaucratic politics model of decision making. This
particular aspect of the model has been characterised
by McNallen, Zand and Lewin as follows:
"In the Political Process or Bargaining Model, the
primary value or objective is the achievement of
power, influence and personal goals (promotion,
wealth, publicity, fame, honors, etc.) of the
leaders or managers." £~26:45j7
Thus, because of the personal and accountable nature
of the environment, the responsibility of internal
review to local line management and not to outside
agencies is of real importance.
c. Internal review allows the commanding officer to
concentrate effort and expertise on areas within his
or her congnizance which are suspect of, or susceptible
to inefficiency, ineffectiveness, fraud, over-
expenditure, questions of fact; or areas too financially
complex to permit a rapid assessment by the
commanding officer as a layman. In its capacity as
as independent internal advisory staff function,
internal review can be directed by the local commander
to focus on the areas listed above in a manner not
possible by operational components of the command.
£Tll:118J7
d. If well done, the work of an internal review
function will not be duplicated (but will be built
upon) by outside agencies, specifically the GAO or
the NAVAUDSVC. The Task Force on Evaluation of Audit,
Inspection and Investigative Components of the
Department of Defense opined that:
"... the command's internal review effort would
contribute to the overall audit service . . .
Defense directives already anticipate that internal
auditors will themselves build upon rather than
duplicate the work of internal review . . . the
General Accounting Office standards state:
64

'Many governmental entities have internal
review activities identified by other names,
such as inspection, appraisal, investigation,
organization and methods, and management
analysis. These activities are often in the
nature of management services, and in varied
ways they assist management in currently super-
vising, advising, and reviewing designated
functions. To prevent duplication of effort,
all auditors - regardless of their level of
government - should use, to the maximum
practical extent, the work that other
auditors or internal review personnel have
previously performed. T (GAO Standards for
Audit, p. 34)
Thus, internal review would continue to be a
supplement to, rather than a substitute for,
internal audit." £"11:154-155 7
e. Independent internal review affords harried line
management an excellent opportunity to "get out of the
trees and look at the forest." This benefit accrues
from the characteristics of internal review previously
discussed and refers to the need of all operational
managers to maintain the colloguial "Big Picture."
f. Internal review serves as an expert flexible
advisory staff to the commanding officer. This
benefit is especially descriptive of the USN's
internal review function, which makes extensive use
of personnel on an ad hoc basis. C 11:130 J This
allows the local commander to assign functional
"experts" from other areas of the command to assist
the internal reviewers in the conduct of special
analyses, etc. requiring special training or
experience not found in the internal review cadre.
g. Internal review has the propensity to identify
legitimate dollar savings which line management can
apply to other areas. The Task Force on Evaluation
of Audit Inspection and Investigative Components of
the Department of Defense has summarized this
relationship as follows:
"... attention to the more traditional concerns
for adequate financial audit coverage of assets,
liabilities, income and expenses, . . . should
not be relegated to a position of secondary
importance. The vulnerabilities to fraud, waste
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and abuse addressed by financial and compliance
audits, . . . are of constant and pressing concern
to installation commanders . . . (and) address
areas in which the commander and his other staff
advisors are the least equipped to protect
themselves without professional audit assistance. . .
Given the internal auditor's primary
emphasis on economy and efficiency audits of
major, service-wide programs and systems, it is
all the more important that the local commander
retain . . . (capacity of) internal review."
£"11:144, 1457
h. "Internal review augments the commander's ability
to respond immediately to warning indicators within
the command by performing evaluations of command
programs, procedures and operations; especially
those related to the expenditures of funds, use of
resources and the control of command property,
material and supplies." E 11:118^7
i. Internal review can serve as the commander's
focal point, clearinghouse and follow-up reviewer
for previous audits by external sources (GAO and
NAVAUDSVC) or previous internal reviews; and as
liaison with external audit agencies. This not only
serves to organize the command's responses to
various external audits but also provides the
framework for the development of a corporate memory
which was discussed previously.
In summary, and to repeat a previous observation,
if properly organized, staffed and executed, internal
review could provide invaluable aid to line management in
many areas; and serve as an extension or alter ego of
the commanding officer.
E. REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNAL REVIEW
This section will provide the reader with an over-
view of the requirements for effective internal review.
Many of the requirements, while important, are self-evident
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and will receive little discussion. Also of note, is
that the uniqueness of individual commands precludes
absolute statements as to the specific amount necessary
of each requirement. Accordingly, words such as
"sufficient" or "enough" must be used when descriptions
are provided. As such, the list developed will be general
in nature and provide only a framework for the development
of specific requirements for any given organization. It
is the objective of the description, when given, to provide
the reader with the level sufficiency required, in order




a. Internal review should have complete independence
in order to make recommendations free of pressures
from other management personnel. (SECNAVINST 7510.8)
b. Internal review should have its own budget.
C 2 7 :94 J This helps insure independence and lessens
the tendency to divert internal review resources to
other areas.
c. Internal review should have direct access to the
commanding officer if the circumstances warrant.
(SECNAVINST 7510.8)
d. Internal review personnel should be free from
assignment to operational roles. O 11:16I_7 For
example, the use of internal review personnel as
additional accounting resources. "The special value
of internal review derives from its independence
from operational responsibility and its ability to





a. Sufficient numbers of personnel should be assigned
to accomplish the intent of internal review.
(SECNAVINST 7510.8) The intent of internal review has
been outlined previously, and shown to be the perogative
of the local commander. Accordingly, the local
commander should assign sufficient numbers of personnel
to accomplish the duties assigned.
b. Personnel assigned should have the necessary
technical qualifications. (SECNAVINST 7510.8)
SECNAVINST 7510.8 states: "Typically, the
disciplines represented in an internal review staff
would consist of (1) financial management and (2) the
dominant technical, scientific or management skill
represented by the command mission." £"10:Encl (2) J
c. Adequate training should be provided on a
continuing basis. (SECNAVINST 7510.8) SECNAVINST
7510.8 states: "training should include not only
auditing fundamentals and techniques of critical
review and examination, but also new areas of
management interest such as use of ADP applications
. . .
" £"10:Encl (2) _7 Examples of some of the
available training are:
1. Army Audit Agency:
One-week and two-week courses covering financial
management, military accounting, statistical
sampling and operational auditing. /7ll:135_7
2. Auditor General of the USN:
A basic-level forty-hour course entitled
"Introduction to Navy Audit and Internal Review."
ZTll:136^7
3. Naval Postgraduate School:o
Two-week course in pratical comptrollership.
d. Adequate supervision and guidance should be
provided. (SECNAVINST 7510. 8) Felix Pomeranz has
provided the following criteria to assist in the
determination of adequacy of supervision O 27 : 95-100_7
Internal review should have written goals and
objectives, a policy and procedures manual, written
audit programs, standards of field work and job
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descriptions. In addition, the working papers and
performance of internal review should be
periodically evaluated.
3. Work Performance
In listing the requirements of good work
performance, the thesis draws heavily from NAVAUDSVC Audit
Program No. 32 - Internal Review in the Department of the
Navy (January, 1979). Accordingly, unless otherwise
referenced, all statements and quotations are taken from
that source.
a. Internal review should have an established audit
plan that "ensures scheduling of those areas of
mandatory and traditional audit coverage and allows
for operational studies and reviews especially in
those areas that may lend themselves to fraud or
abuse.
"
b. Internal review should use NAVAUDSVC standardized
audit programs in the conduct of its review of
functional areas.
c. Internal review, as a minimum, should have audit
coverage of the following functional areas:
1. Civilian Payroll and Timekeeping - Audit
Program No. 2.
2. Accountability and Control of Plant Property
and other Navy Property - Audit Program No. 6.
3. Procurement and Supply Management - Audit
Program Nos. 8, 10A, 10B, and 12.
4. Management of Transportation Equipment -
Audit Program No. 27.




d. Working papers should properly document the
reviews conducted. (GAO Standards and SECNAVINST
7510.8)
.
e. Internal review should conduct liaison and
follow-up action. (SECNAVINST 7510.8)
4. Command Support
The requirement of "command support" is nebulous,
but important to effective internal review. Proper or
sufficient command support is indicated by such things
as the existance of command instructions regarding
internal review, evidence of action by the commanding
officer on the findings and recommendations of internal
review and evidence that command attention is focused on
prividmg both the appropriate quantity and quality of
internal review personnel. £"28: 4_7
Perhaps the greatest impact of command attention
is in the area of "motivation." The following excerpt
from the NAVAUDSVC Audit Emphasis Program on Internal
Review in the Navy supports this view:
"Our discussions with Internal Review personnel,
review of their reports, and observations indicated
a lack of motivation and assertiveness within the
division . . . We believe that one of the primary
problems in Internal Review is that the auditors
feel that management is not responsive to their
recommendations, therefore, 'why bother' . . .
with a lack of motivation permeating Internal Review,
the new people (recently hired) could develop




This chapter traced the history of auditing,
differentiated between the various types and levels of
auditing, and stated the characteristics and benefits of
effective internal review. The requirements necessary for
effective internal review were overviewed as well.
The numerous definitions, references and quotations
used in the chapter were not intended to add length or
clutter, but to provide the reader with documented
evidence upon which to gain perspective on the background
material presented. In such a study as this, the absence
of quantitative data forces narrative descriptions and
arguments vice difinitive graphic displays.
The chapter seeked to convey a sense of history and
development of auditing in general and internal review in
particular. In addition, the chapter's objective was tr>
imbue the reader with a perspective of internal review
from the local commanding officer's viewpoint with which
to assimilate the characteristics, benefits and requirements
listed.
The next chapter will provide the reader with the
current status of internal review in the DOD, concentrating
on the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy.
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III. STATUS OF INTERNAL REVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present the reader
with evidential matter from which to judge the current
position of internal review in the Department of the Navy
(DON) in as objective a manner as possible.
This chapter will provide the reader with documented
survey results which indicate the status of internal review
in the DON. To a lesser degree, internal review in the
DON will be compared and contrasted with its counterparts
in the Department of the Army (DA) and the Department of
the Air Force (DAF)
.
As a possible aid to enable the reader to gain a
better understanding of the subjective points of the
discussion, the reader might want to visualize an "internal
review balance sheet" in which the various aspects of
internal review discussed can appear as asset or liability
"accounts." These "accounts," much like those known in the
private sector accounting vernacular as "differred costs/
charges" or "differred revenues/credits," £" 29:13^7* are able
to assume either "asset" or "liability" classifications
depending upon the account's balance. Examples of these
types of private sector items are: prepaid insurance,




A specific example would be the situation where a
business entity leases its facilities. In the case where
the lease payments are "prepaid" (i.e. paid on the first
day of the period for the entitlement to use the facilities
throughout the period) , a balance sheet "snapshot" on a
specific date during that period, would probably show the
account balance as "positive," or an "asset." On the
other hand, in the case where lease payments are paid at
the end of a period to cover the use of the facilities
during that period a balance sheet "snapshot" would
properly reflect some allocated amount as a "negative" or
"liability account" representing the entity's obligation
to pay for its use of the facilities to date.
While the analogy is not direct or as clear as the
above example, the various aspects of internal review
behave in much the same manner. Consider, for illustration,
the general category of "staffing." Since all commands
and field activities are to some degree unique, there can
be no single measure of sufficient staffing. However, there
can be a subjective determination of sufficiency. If the
determination is that sufficient staffing exists, the
"account" termed "staffing" would be an asset and have a
positive affect on the "internal review balance sheet."
However, if it is determined that staffing is insufficient,
then the staffing "account" would be considered a liability
and have a negative affect on the "balance sheet."
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Like the financial statement, the "internal review
balance sheet" has a balancing account. Instead of
"retained earnings," this author offers that the internal
review balancing account might be designated "effectiveness; 1
and be visualized to carry a "positive" balance - indicating
effectiveness, or a "negative" balance - indicating
ineffectiveness. The magnitude of this balance would
indicate the use of what adjectives such as "more" or "less, 1
should be applied when referring to the interpretation of
the "account."
Throughout the following discussions then, the reader
should maintain a mental register of the various "account"
balances, which culminate in a subjective determination of
the "effectiveness" of internal review in the DON.
B. GENERAL
"There are many important issues we all must contend
with each day, and I realize that the time available
to fully explore each of these is rather limited.
Among these issues, however, I consider three to be
of particular significance to our financial
management community - violation reports, overtime
practices, and internal review (emphasis added).
. . . with the establishment of an effective
internal review program, great strides can be made
in eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse in Government
expenditures. Unfortunately, many activities have
not implemented an internal review program, and many
of those that have, have limited the scope of their
internal review functions to areas not directly
related to mission accomplishment"! (emphasis added)
In an era when funds and ceiling points are
constantly being cut, a good internal review staff
will more than pay for itself.
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These are matters of considerable importance to
me and to you and I feel they merit Command attention.
I would appreciate your conveying to your Commanding
Officer or Officer in Charge my thoughts on these
issues." f 30:2J
With these words, the acting Comptroller of the Navy
(NAVCOMPT) , RADM S. D. Frost, SC, USN, has summarized both
the importance and status of internal review in the DON.
Not only that, he has directed in strong diplomatic
language that internal review "become" important to the
DON's financial managers' and levied upon these comptrollers
and fiscal officers the duty of educating line management
accordingly.
What prompted one of the DON's highest financial
managers to make these statements? What evidence exists
to support the conclusion that "... many activities have
not implemented an internal review program, and many of
those that have, have limited the scope (of internal
review) . . . ?"
This chapter will seek to answer these questions by
providing the data upon which this author feels the
conclusion quoted above was based. In doing so, the
chapter will concentrate on four major areas of measurement
existence, staffing, organization and performance. Like
NAVCOMPT, the author will rely heavily upon the work of the
NAVAUDSVC Z"9_7 whose conclusion NAVCOMPT restated above.
Also, recent surveys by The Task Force on Evaluation of
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Audit, Inspection and Investigative Components of the
Department of Defense (hereafter referred to as the
"Task Force") CH^ and by Lieutenant Colonel John C.
Baggette, USMC ZT"20J7 will contribute substantially.
The "Task Force" states that "several evaluations of
internal review activities, . . . have challenged the
overall quality of internal review work performed within
Defense (Department of)."
/
T11:134J7 The report continues
with the following excerpts from the Draft Study of the
Operations and Relationships of Audit, Inspection and
Review Groups in the Department of Defense . /7H'134> 135J7
"The work of most internal review activities was
very limited in scope and depth, and the quality
of work was generally unsatisfactory in 72 percent
of the reports and workpapers we reviewed."
"In the Army . . . only 41 percent of the work
done by these activities met the minimal standards
for audit. Audit programs normally were not
prepared . . . and data collected . . . was often
not sufficient to support the findings contained
in reports."
"Only three of the seventeen Navy internal
review offices we visited were doing any work which
met audit standards."
"We reviewed five reports and workpapers
(undertaken by Marine Corps internal review
personnel) and found that minimal audit standards
had been met in one."
The above summarization emphasized shortcomings relating
to the measurement areas of organization and work performance;
namely: "limited in scope and depth" and "generally
unsatisfactory." It is interesting for purposes of this
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thesis, to note that while the characterization holds
true for all the military Departments that were reviewed,
the DON (USN and USMC) appears to be the worst (17.6
percent and 20 percent respectively, compared to 41 percent
for DA)
.
Prior to concentration on the DON, it \vould be
beneficial to understand the internal review functions of
DA and DAF. Accordingly, the next two sections will outline
for the reader the organization and status of the internal
review functions of the DA and DAF in order to provide a
basis for comparison and contrast.
C. INTERNAL REVIEW IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (DA)
1. History
The DA internal review function was established
shortly after the passage of the National Security Act
Amendments of 1949 for the purpose of enabling commanders
to "examine subordinate activities with identified or
possible problems and to decide upon remedial measures."
ZT31:2J7
Initially, the internal review groups were
organized under the local comptrollers, with guidance and
monitoring from the Comptroller of the Army who delegated
this responsibility to the Army Audit Agency. £ 11:2 J
In 1974, the internal review function was
transferred to the Inspector General of the Army at the
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Army Staff level; and likewise, the local internal review
functions were placed under their respective Inspectors
General. The Army Audit Agnecy was also reassigned to the
Inspector General of the Army and retained its responsibility
to monitor local internal review functions. £~31:2_7
In 1978, the Comptroller of the Army regained
cognizance over internal review, while oversight
responsibilities remained with the Army Audit Agency.
Since 1978, most local internal review groups have been
reorganized under their respective local comptrollers.
r31:2j
2. Current Organization
The Army internal review system consists of three
hierarchical levels as shown by Figure III-l. At the
departmental level, one GS-510 auditor is responsible,
under the cognizance of the Comptroller of the Army, foT:
£731:4.7
a. Promulgating policies and monitoring execution
of internal review in the DA.
b. Interpreting policy for internal reviewers
throughout the DA.
c. Prescribing the contents of technical audit
training for internal reviewers in the DA.
d. Distributing copies of Army Audit Agency audit
regulations and circulars to all internal
review groups
.
At each of the major commands and Army Staff































a. determine and issue policy.
b. provide coordination.
c. provide follow-up and liaison.
d. plan and accomplish special request audits.
e. monitor internal review activities at the
installation level.
At most installations, from one to twenty internal
reviewers have the major responsibilities of: £"31:5.7
a. programming, audit planning and conducting
audits of appropriated and non-appropriated funds.
b. providing liaison with assistance teams from
DA, major Army commands and external audit
organizations such as the GAO.
c. ascertaining if previously disclosed
dif ficiencies have been corrected.
The Comptroller of the Army, through Army Regulation
11-7, has prescribed the role, responsibilities and scope of
internal review throughout the DA. These policies are
designed, in part, to create uniformity in the performance
of internal reviews, subject internal review personnel to
professional auditing standards, and promote the enhancement
of internal review personnel's qualifications. £"31:6 jl
The thrust of the Comptroller of the Army's program, is to
increase the effectiveness of internal review by improving
the caliber and performance of assigned personnel. £"31:6J7
The Comptroller of the Army monitors compliance
with prescribed policies through on-site visits, by the
one departmental level internal reviewer. £"31:7 J7 Each
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command's internal review program is reviewed on a two or
three-year cycle, with a written report submitted to the
Comptroller. C 31:7 J
At the major commands and DA staff elements, the
internal review function is responsible not only for
reviewing the programs of its respective major command or
DA staff element but also evaluating the internal review
functions of subordinate commands and installations. ZT31:7J7
In accomplishing this mission assignment, these internal
review groups
:
a. evaluate and monitor subordinate internal review
functions by
1. examining and approving each installation's
annual internal review program.
2. conducting annual or semi-annual surveilance
visits of each subordinate internal review element
in order to:
(a) evaluate changes to annual program.
(b) audit accomplishments.
(c) monitor compliance.
(d) ascertain problems in training or staffing.
A written report of the findings is made to the head of
the local internal review* group, who must respond through
the local comptroller. £"31:8, 9 J
b. provide and interpret policy guidance to subordinate
internal review functions. £~31:9_7
c. issue "Awareness Program" reports. These reports
are basically a compilation of deficiencies disclosed
by audits and reviews at installations within the
major command. They list the most significant
deficiencies in terms of dollar amount and frequency
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of occurance; and set forth actions necessary for
correction. These reports are designed to encourage
commanders who are not audited to examine their own
operations and take remedial measures where required.
The reports are not released to external audit groups
or DA elements above the major command level. Z~31:9_7
d. prepare internal review programs, perform audits,
monitor audit compliance and provide liaison service
for their respective command. £~31:10_7
At the installation level, the internal review
function is designed to:
a. furnish the local commander with an independent
appraisal of operations within the local command.
£"31:11.7
b. assist installation activities in determining
problem areas and deficiencies; and recommending
corrective actions. ZT 31:11 J7
c. act as the local command's focal point in
monitoring audit compliance and providing liaison
with external audit groups. £~31:11_7
The installation internal review function
accomplishes these mission tasks by:
a. developing an annual internal review program
of work and training. £ 31: 11 J7
b. performing appropriated fund reviews including
financial and compliance, economy and efficiency,
and program results reviews. /. 31:12 J
c. conducting non-appropriated fund audits. C 31:14 J
d. accomplishing follow-up reviews. /T31:14_7
e. providing liaison with all external audit teams.
£-31:15J
The Corps of Engineer's internal review group
performs many of the same functions listed above; but also
82

has the assigned task of auditing civil works contracts,
a responsibility shared only with the Defense Contract
Audit Agency. [ 31:16 J
In summary, the DA internal review function is a
three-tiered hierarchical organization organized under the
Comptroller of the Army. Each level has responsibility for
the elements subordinate to it in the hierarchical structure;
and are subject to evaluation and review themselves by the
next higher hierarchical tier. The other missions and
responsibilities of internal review in the DA are not
substantially different from those described in Chapter II
as applicable to DON.
3. Staffing
As of 30 September 1979, the DA had a total of
1,108 internal review billets. £"31:18.7 1,016 of these
were auditors, and 92 were administrative slots. £ 31: 18 J
The vast majority of the auditors were civilian; 1003, or
98.7 percent of the total. O ll\18 J The hierarchical
distribution of auditors was as follows: £31:18 J
a. Department level - 1
b. Major command level - 135 (average of 5.9
personnel per command)
c. Installation level - 880 (average of 3.8
per installation)
For fiscal year 1979, the internal review costs
within the DA were $25.3 million for personnel, $1.1 million
for travel and $0.6 million for other support; for a total
of $27 million. C 31:18J7
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With respect to the numbers of personnel, the
Comptroller of the Army recently conducted an analysis
which concluded that 254 additional auditors were necessary
for acceptable audit coverage. ZT 31 : 19 _/ Figure III -2
provides a graphic comparison of Internal Review Staffing
in the DOD.
DA internal review personnel are required to be
qualified auditors. £"31:19_7 Applicants for positions must
have the following qualifications: /T 31 : 19 J7
a. GS-5 auditor - Four years of college study in-
cluding twenty-four semester hours of accounting and
auditing, or possess a baccalaureate degree in
accounting. Four years of professional accounting
or auditing experience is an acceptable substitute
for the educational requirements.
b. GS-7 auditor - In addition to the requisites
above, must have completed one year of graduate
study in accounting or auditing, or have at least
one additional year of professional experience.
Training of internal review personnal in the DA-
consists of the usual on-the-job training, work assignment
rotation, formal training classes conducted by the Army
Audit Agency and other specialized training courses
developed and sponsored by both the DA and outside agencies.
Z~31:20_7 In the fiscal year 1978, 175 internal review
personnel attended the classes offered by the Army Audit
Agency; and in fiscal year 1979, the number of attendees
were 244. /7 31:20j/ These classes covered such areas as
automatic data processing, statistical sampling, logistic
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The specialized training courses offered, cover audit
subjects ranging from financial management, military
accounting, planning, programming and budgeting systems,
and operational auditing to basic and advanced automatic
data processing. O 31:21 J In fiscal year 1978, 280 internal
review personnel attended these courses; and in fiscal
year 1979, 300 attended. £ "b\\2\ J Figure III - 3 provides
a comparison between DA training and DON training.
4 . Work Performance
Internal review groups in the DA make use of
standard Army Audit Agency audit programs to aid in
improving their performance. /T31:7_7 In addition, each
internal review group is required to prepare an annual
internal review program which is reviewed and approved to
ensure that all mandatory reviews (non-appropriated fund
audits and follow-ups of previous audits) are scheduled,
appropriated fund areas are adequately covered, local
commanders' requested work is performed, and that training
is planned. £ 31:8 J
Generally, speaking, the major command internal
review groups spend most of their time performing duties
other than audits, follow-ups and compliance work. /T31:10J7
The reasons given for this, are staff limitations and the













* Concerning this figure, the Depute Comptroller of the Navy
stated: "Obviously, many of these students were not
members of formal internal review staffs. The individual
commands control the selection of attendees and they
tend to use the course for training any of their personnel
involved in financial management." /" 11 : 136 J7
** The Task Force stated that in its review of the USN it:
"found few internal review personnel who had been
authorized to attend." £ 11:136 J
INTERNAL REVIEW TRAINING




At the installation level, approximately 25 to 30
percent of auditor time is expended on reviews of
appropriated fund activities. £T31:12_7 Audits of non-
appropriated fund activities consume approximately 25 to
40 percent of the available auditor time, much of which in
mandatory reviews. £"31:14_7 The regulatory requirement to
conduct follow-up reviews of previous audit findings occupy
approximately 25 percent of available auditor time. £"31:14.7
The remaining 5 to 25 percent, is spent on items such as
providing liaison with external audit organizations. £~ 31:15 J
During fiscal year 1979, the DA's internal review
groups issued 6,803 reports. £"31:18 J Of the 3,430 reports
issued during the first six months of the fiscal year,
456 (13.3 percent) concerned audits of civil works contracts
and 998 (29 percent) dealt with either non-appropriated
fund activities or follow-up reviews. £"31:18
_7 The
remaining 2,081 (60.7 percent) dealt with appropriated fund
activities, with over half (1,131 or 54.3 percent)
resulting from reviews of such areas as fund controls and
expenditures, material acquisitions, material and equipment
storage and issues. £ 31:18 J
The Comptroller of the Army has emphasized internal
review's responsibility to ferret out waste, fraud and
abuse during the course of every audit. £"31:22 J The
procedures set up to handle disclosures of such situations
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normally require the internal reviewer to advise the
local comptroller and commander in writing of suspicious
findings, inform local Criminal Investigation Command
representatives, and, if appropriate, the chief of the
reviewed elements. /T 3 1 : 2 2 J7 The internal reviewer then
withdraws from the engagement unless requested to continue
by the local commander or an investigation. O 31:22
_7
During fiscal year 1979, internal reviewers of the DA used
these procedures to report fraud or potential fraud in 48
instances. £" 31:22J
5 . Summary
The "Task Force" has described the DA's internal
review program as the "most vigorous" of the Defense
Departments. /~11:125J7 This description appears to be
accurate from the data presented above and from a
comparison with the other services (presented below)
.
Notwithstanding the obvious organization, coordination,
and hierarchical review procedures; the reader is reminded
of the findings of the Study of the Operations and
Relationships of Audit, Inspection and Review Groups in the
Department of Defense
,
3 November 1978,. which stated, in
part
:
"In the Array . . . only 41 percent of the work done
by these (internal review) activities met the minimal
standards for audit. Audit programs normally were
not prepared . . . and data collected . . . was often








The antithesis of decentralized internal review,
as exemplified by the DA and DON, is the system established
by the Department of the Air Force (DAF) . Unlike her sister
services, the DAF does not assign permanent internal review
personnel to local commandres. £"11:131.7 Instead, the
Air Force Audit Agnecy (AFAA) , under the "Commander Audit
Program" (CAP) , dedicates up to 15 percent of direct audit
time to the special audit needs of local commanders that
are not otherwise covered by the AFAA's ongoing cyclic
audit efforts. £~11:131J7 Based on current staffing levels,
this equates to approximately 157 man years of internal
review as compared to the DA's permanent assignment of
1,016 internal review auditors. C 32:26 J
2 Organization
The AFAA is organizationally located so that it
reports directly to the Secretary of the Air Force. The
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Manage-
ment provides technical guidance and supervision on audit
policy and management matters. The AFAA also has direct
access to the Air Force Chief of Staff (equivalent to
USN's CNO) . £"32:26:7
The AFAA itself, is a regional type organization
similar to NAVAUDSVC with branches located at 85 Air Force
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installations world-wide. C 32:26 J The mission of the
AFAA is esentially the same as the Army Audit Agnecy or
NAVAUDSVC, with the exception that it is the only formal
organization within the DAF assigned to perform internal
review type activities. £"11:131.7
Under the authority of Air Force Regulation 23-28,
2 3 May 1979; and Air Force Audit Agency Regulation
175-101, 31 October 1979; the AFAA can perform locally
requested audits on behalf of the local commander of any
function or activity within their jurisdiction provided
that: C 11:1317
a. the audit is not conducted to gather data for
use in responding to an inspection report;
b. the audit is not for data reasonably available
through command or other sources;
c. the area in which the audit is requested has
not been recently subjected to audit; or
d. the request is not for an audit of non-
appropriated funds.
The limitations described above, coupled with the
perception by local Air Force commanders that resident
AFAA auditors were "external," have resulted in what is
«
essentially the establishment of informal internal review
groups to provide the benefits described in Chapter II
of this thesis. On this matter, the "Task Force" affirmed
agreement with the Joint Department of Defense Study,
Report of Survey of Utilization of Internal Review Personnel
in the Department of Defense and Relationship to Internal
Audit Function
,
dated 16 August 1967 which stated:
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"... Interviews with (Air Force) base commanders
and/or comptrollers indicated that trouble-shooting
and one-time studies were performed by either base
management analysts, the responsible staff officer,
operating activity, or an ad-hoc group appointed by
the base commander." £"11:145 J7
In summary, the internal review function in the
DAF, is organized as an additional function of the
centralized internal audit agency. The AFAA is limited
by regulation to the expenditure of not more than 15 percent
of direct audit time in the performance of these requested
reviews; and also in the scope of the reviews. The affect
of these limitations has been shown to be the establishment
of informal ad hoc internal review groups at the local
level, in order to provide the local commander with some
measure of internal review's benefits.
3. Staffing
In fiscal year 1979, the AFAA had 1,044 auditors
assigned with an audit budget of $25,0 million. £32:26_7
This compares to other DOD centralized internal audit
agencies as follows: £ 32:23-32 J
a. Army Audit Agency: 823 auditors, $24.3 million
b. Army Corps of Engineers: 150 auditors, $4.5 million
c. Defense Audit Service: 369 auditors, $14.0 million
d. Defense Contract Audit Agency: 2,910 auditors,
$90.0 million




£. Naval Audit Service: 552 auditors, $17.3 million
g. Total DOD: 5,960 auditors, $177.5 million
(See Figure III-4 for a graphic display)
Excluding the DOD-wide organizations, the service
departments in fiscal year 1979 had a total of 2,681
auditors, with annual budgets totaling $73.5 million. Thus,
of the uniformed services, the AFAA had 38.9 percent of the
personnel and 34.0 percent of the total budget.
From these available 1,044 auditors, the AFAA had
the authority to use 15 percent or 156.6 man years for the
purpose of CAP or internal review. In actuality, CAP only
accounted for 5.1 percent or 53.2 man years of direct
audit time in fiscal year 1979. /7 11 : 148 _7 Again, this
compares to the 1,016 full-time auditors assigned to the
DA's internal review groups. The AFAA has estimated,
however, that it requires 575 additional auditors and 90
additional support personnel. /J" 11 : 143 J7 This would
increase the total available man years for internal review
functions by 86.2 to 242.8.
4 . Work Performance
The "Task Force" again referred to the "Joint
Study Group's" report in characterizing this area, by
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"... recurring criticism (of DAF commanders and
operating officials) was that many (internal)
auditors seemed to dwell on finding and reporting
deficiencies rather than determining solutions, and
seldom made positive comments on portions of
operations found to be satisfactory. . . Managers
often believed the'y had a better method to correct
the deficiency than was recommended by the auditors,
but felt that the auditors did not adequately
consider management's solution."
"... Many managers commented that auditors
were generalists rather than functional experts,
and often were not sufficiently knowledgeable of
functions being reviewed when they began an audit.
As a result, operating personnel were required to
spend an excessive amount of time briefing the
auditors and answering their questions."
Conversely, from the higher echelons of the
Government hierarchy, the GAO has expressly set forth the
internal audit agencies' duty to place primary attention
on "operational" audits of service-wide programs for
economy, efficiency and effectiveness as follows: £"11:143J7
"The Audit Agency's use of scarce staff resources
for secondary efforts (i.e., commander requested
audits and audits of non-appropriated fund activities)
and its allocation of one-half its total staff time
to audits of financial management activities have
significantly reduced its capability to perform its
primary mission (i.e. audits for economy, efficiency
and effectiveness) and decreased its value as a
management tool." (quoted from GAO report No. FHMSD-
77-49, "Why the Army Should Strengthen Its Internal
Audit Function," 26 July 1976, p. 31)
5 . Summary
Thus, it has been shown that the centralized
internal review function, as it exists in the DAF, has been
the subject of criticism from both upper and lower echelons.
The local commanders, who, by regulation, depend upon the
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AFAA to provide internal review services, have criticized
the "external" nature of the agency, the manner and method
of the conduct of an audit, and the lack of local knowledge
by the auditors, leading to the increased inconvenience
of local operating personnel. These local commanders,
it has been seen, have in fact organized their own internal
review groups using station personnel on an ad hoc basis.
The GAO on the other hand, has criticized the
internal audit agencies for devoting too much time and
effort to the secondary tasks of internal review type audits
and audits of non-appropriated funds.
The centralized internal review function then, is
caught in a true paradox of notable importance: The lower
echelon avoids the use of the service; and the higher
echelon criticizes the service which is provided. As
evidenced by the CAP utilization statistics presented above
and the selective attitude of internal audit agencies given
in Chapter II, the net result is apparently a significant
decrease in the conduct of internal review by "qualified"
' personnel.
E. INTERNAL REVIEW IN THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
This section will present the findings of a recent
survey of internal review in the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)
conducted by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Baggette, USMC.
The survey formed the basis for Lieutenant Colonel Bagette's
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Master of Science in Management Thesis at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The thesis is
entitled "A Survey of Internal Review in the U.S. Marine
Corps;" and is dated June, 1980. £ 20 J All quotations
and paraphrased material, unless otherwise indicated, come




Lieutenant Colonel Baggett's total population
consisted of 27 USMC internal review groups; 15 shore
activities, and 12 operational activities. The survey
sampled 55 percent of this population, or 15 activities.
z^7 2 : 42 _7 I n conducting the survey, a questionnaire
consisting of 25 questions grouped under four major areas
was used in order to organize data. The four major areas
surveyed were staffing, organization, work performance,
and reporting. Figures III-5, III-6, III-7, and 1 1 1 - 8 are
slightly modified versions of the originals; and graphically
display the results of the survey. The data displayed
corresponds to the survey questionnaire, which is reprinted
as Appendix A to this thesis.
2 History
As a component of the DON, the USMC's implementation
of internal review is the same as that previously outlined
in Chapter II of this thesis. All DOD and SECNAV directives,
instructions, and other guidance apply equally to the





















Are sufficient personnel assigned to accomplish the
intent of internal review?
Do assigned personnel have the necessary technical _
qualifications authorized?
Do the working papers reflect the necessary technical
competence?
Is adequate training provided on a continuing basis?
Is adequate supervision provided?
USMC INTERNAL REVIEW STAFFING
















a. Is internal review authorized in a local regulation?
b. Does internal review have its own budget?
c. Have steps been taken to avoid intentional duplication
with NAVAUDSVC activities?
d. Does the internal review staff have complete independence
in order to make recommendations free of pressures from
other management personnel?
USMC INTERNAL REVIEW ORGANIZATION
Figure I I I -6
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a. Is there an annual internal review program that ensures
scheduling of those areas of mandatory and traditional
audit coverage and allows for operational studies and
reviews especially in area that may lend themselves to
fraud or waste?
b. Is the audit coverage of functional areas performed hy
internal review satisfactory?
c. Does internal review accomplish the required audit
liaison and follow-up actions?
d. Are internal reviews performed properly?
e. Do the working papers properly document the reviews?
f. Are internal review programs and objectives revised to
reflect changing conditions?
g. Are internal review activities directed toward appropriate
projects rather than clerical tasks?
h. Does internal review provide orientation training on the
provisions of R.S. 3679 to newly assigned personnel who
will be dealing with appropriated funds?





















Are internal review findings and recommendations reported
to the commander properly?
Does the commander get involved in correction of reported
deficiencies?
Does internal review enjoy the support and acceptance of
the commander?
Are findings dollarized where practical?
Are findings usually accepted?
Are recommendations usually accepted?
Do internal review reports require a response by the
reviewee?
Are reports followed up as to whether deficiencies are
corrected and recommendations considered?




further guidance through a series of Marine Corps Orders
(MCO) issued by the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. The
most notable of this supplemental guidance is contained in
MCO 7540. 2A, dated 24 September 1979, entitled "Internal
Review." This document has stated the purpose of internal
review in the USMC as follows:
"To provide commanders and organic capability to
examine, analyze, evaluate and explore those areas
of operations where known or potential problem areas
exist which may adversely affect the efficient and
economical use of command resources.
Internal review represents an extension of the
financial management responsibilities of commanders
to ensure that the commitment of resources is in
accordance with prescribed statutory requirements
and in conformance with the policies and procedures
directed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps
.
Within the context, the internal review function
will periodically assess the effectiveness of
prescribed internal control procedures, not only
for, the accountability, recordation, certification
and expenditure of appropriated funds, but also for
the effective use of personnel resources and the
control of command property, materials and supplies. -
The effective use of internal review will not
only provide commanders a means for assessing the
adequacy and quality of internal command operations,
but will also serve as the basis for the timely
detection and correction of unsatisfactory
conditions and practices." /7 33: 1, 2 J
The above description emphasizes the "organic"
nature of internal review in the USMC; and its position
as an "extension of the financial management responsibilities
of commanders." It further delineates the financial and
compliance, economy and efficiency, and program results
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(effectiveness) responsibilities of internal review; as
these categories were described previously by this thesis.
The next sections will provide the results of the
Baggette survey grouped into the major areas of staffing,
organization, and work performance. The findings will be
presented succinctly. The reader should refer to
Lieutenant Colonel Baggette ' s thesis for a more complete
discussion of individual findings.
3. Organization /T 20 : 62 J7
a. Independence
The survey found that 73 percent of the
internal review groups were locally chartered; and that
approximately 50 percent of the groups had a separate
budget. However, the groups were not perceived as unbiased,
objective, and independent organizations with free access
to the local commander.
As stated previously in this thesis, the
"appearance" of independence is regarded by professional
auditors as being as equally important as de facto
independence. £"35:40J7 The organizational position of
the internal review group within the local command, does much
to either enhance or detract from the perception of
independence. The Institute of Internal Auditors (HA) has
listed the concept of independence as the first of its
five areas of concern for internal auditors. The IIA's
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Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing lists this area as: "the independence of the
Internal Auditing Department from the activities audited
and the objectivity of internal auditors." C 15:27 J
Thus, the location of the internal review function in the
office of the comptroller in accordance with DON policy,
ZT10:1_7 probably amounts to a fatal flaw. C 20:62 J
b. Authority
The survey determined that through both local
regulation and command support, the surveyed activities
had the necessary authority to accomplish the intent of
the regulations.
4. Staffing
a. Sufficiency of Assigned Personnel £ 20:59, 60 J
Eighty-one percent of the authorized internal
review billets were filled as of September, 1979; but only
40 percent of the activities surveyed considered the
authorized levels to be satisfactory. The activities
surveyed also indicated, that as the government-wide
campaign against fraud, waste and abuse intensifies, this
level of satisfaction would be further erroded. In addition,
it was opined by these same activities, that the increased
scope of internal review (as defined by MCO 7540. 2A of
24 September 1979) would also contribute to the future
inadequacy of the authorized billets.
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The survey also found that, contrary to USMC
policy, the internal review groups were universally
reluctant to employ ad hoc, temporary or part-time
reviewers from outside the internal review organization,
b. Technical Qualifications C 20:60 J
The survey found that most personnel assigned
to the internal review positions had the required technical
qualifications. However, many activities questioned the
adequacy of these requirements in general and for enlisted
personnel in particular. The survey's findings on working
papers, coupled with the Task Forces' finding which states:
"We reviewed five reports and workpapers and found that
minimal audit standards have been met in one;" ZTll: 135 J
seem to bear strong witness to the truth of this inadequacy
Lieutenant Colonel Baggette conveyed the importance of
proper qualifications when he stated: ". . ., internal-
review personnel will function more like auditors than
troubleshooters in the future and will need the skills to
match the task." £~20:60J7 The "task," has been clearly
and cogently communicated by the recent actions of
President Reagan. Within hours of his inauguration, the
President ordered that the 15 executive departmental
inspectors general be replaced by, as spokesman James Brady
described it, people who are "meaner than a junkyard dog in




The survey found that only 20 percent of the
activities were meeting the compliance standard. The
reason most often stated was either lack of resources or
training opportunities.
d. Supervision /T20:61J7
The survey found the perception that supervision
was inadequate. This is evidenced by the fact that two-
thirds of the internal review groups surveyed, complained
about a lack of performance feedback.
5 . Work Performance
Ninety-three percent of the activities surveyed,
did not adequately schedule necessary reviews such as those
identified by the Naval Audit Service's (NAVAUDSVC)
internal review audit program. This audit program (Number
thirty-two) identifies several areas considered mandatory
in countering fraud and waste, such as civilian payroll and
timekeeping, accountability and control of plant property,
procurement, supply management, and management of
transportation equipment.
The survey ,also found total non-compliance with
General Accounting Office (GAO) standards for working papers
These standards require working papers to be complete and
accurate, clear and understandable, legible and neat; and




Based on four criteria, C 20:64;/ the survey
concluded that only about 40 percent of the activities were
in compliance with established effectiveness measures.
a. Only 53 percent of the activities correctly
reported the results of the reviews conducted to
the local commander.
b. None of the activities surveyed regularly
attempted to dollarize review findings in order to
better project the magnitude of a problem to the
local commander.
c. Only one-third of the surveyed activities had
any procedure established to ensure the reviewers
acknowledged the report in writing.
d. Less than half of the activities surveyed had
any program of follow up established to check and
report on corrective actions taken.
6 . Summary
This section has shown the "organic nature of
internal review in the USMC and provided the reader with
its defined scope.
In presenting the findings of Lieutenant Colonel
Baggette's survey, the section has shown deficiencies in
all four major areas, but most natably in those of
organization, work performance and reporting. In this
author's opinion, the deficiency in staffing probably
could be overcome in the short run through increased
effective use of ad hoc personnel. However, the increased
visibility of the internal review function regarding the
elimination of waste and fraud, not to mention the task




A deficiency in organization has been shown to be
lack of apparent independence. This deficiency was also
shown to be one pervading even the private sector to such
an extent as to warrant top billing in the IIA's list of
major concerns. The primary contributor to this
misappearance of independence was shown to be the
organizational location of the internal review function.
The deficiencies associated with the areas of work
performance and reporting are numerous; but the survey
commented that the majority could be resolved through more
effective training of internal review personnel, to
include revisions of qualification criteria.
In short, while the internal review in the USMC
has been shown to be ineffective in several major areas,
the solutions are feasible and certainly well within the
realm of accomplishment. The internal review function was
shown by the survey to be responsive to the local
commander's needs and directed towards appropriate projects
F. INTERNAL REVIEW IN THE U.S. NAVY
1 . Background
Prior to 1976, the only central direction regarding
internal review in the DON was contained in volume I of
the Navy Comptroller Manual. £~36:1J7 That Manual
specified that internal review was a comptrollership
function consisting of eight financially oriented functions
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conducted mainly within the comptroller area. £"36:1.7
Internal review was specified to be the responsibility of
each command. No other USN organization was assigned any
responsibilities regarding internal review. £ 36:1 J
The issuance of SECNAVINST 7510.8 in October, 1976
re-emphasized the need for internal review in the DON, and
broadened its scope to include any areas subject to
inefficiency, misapplication of funds, fraud or theft. /~36:1_7
This instruction also tasked various headquarters elements
to issue supplemental guidance; and charged the Auditor
General of the Navy with the responsibility for developing
and conducting training; and for providing technical
guidance to internal review personnel. C 36:1 J
More recently, the acting Comptroller of the Navy
(NAVCOMPT) , RADM S. D. Frost, SC, USN referred to the need
for an effective internal review function by stating:
"... with the establishment of an effective
internal review program, great strides can be made
in eliminating waste, fraud and abuse in
Government expenditures ... In an era when funds
and ceiling points are constantly being cut, a good
internal review staff will more than pay for itself."
£~30:2 7
In the same issue of the Financial Management
Newsletter
,
LCDR R. A. Bobulinski, SC, USN reported that:
".
. .a Navy Department official noted that internal
review capability in the Department of the Navy (DON) was
only about 15 percent effective . . ." £ 40:27 J
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In view of the demonstrated high level advocacy of
internal review in the DON, the author concurs with LCDR
Bobulinski's question concerning the status of internal
review in the DON: "... why is this the case?" /J 40: 27
7
This section will attempt to provide evidential
matter from which the reader may gain insight into this
apparent gap between high level advocacy and low level
implementation.
This section will review the current status of
internal review in the U.S. Navy (USN) as determined by the
NAVAUDSVC in its fiscal year 1979 "Internal Review Audit
Emphasis Program." C 36 J Under this program, NAVAUDSVC
required its auditors to examine the performance of the
internal review groups during each periodic or continuous
audit. /T36:2_7 During the period covered (FY 1979), 142
activities, including all major USN activities, were
examined. ZT 36: 2 _7 These 142 activities had a total of
215 full-time and 35 part-time internal review personnel,
which represented approximately one-half of the full-time
personnel assigned to the USN's internal review program.
ZT36:2 J
This section will be organized into the areas of
organization, staffing and work performance. The reader is
requested to refer to the previous section on internal




The Task Force, in comparing internal review in
the USN with internal review in the DA, stated: "Naval
internal review also differs from its counterpart in the
Army in that it is totally decentralized." £~11:128_7
The NAVAUDSVC report has summarized this
decentralization as follows:
"The basic philosophy of the Navy is that internal
review is an essential element of a commanding
officer's system of management control within his
activity, [emphasis added) The type of personnal
to be used, the use of full-time or part-time
personnel and the precise nature of the functions
performed generally is left to the discretion of
each commanding officer , (emphasis added)
No staff element of the Navy Secretariat is
assigned any specific responsibility for internal
review policy
,
except for that responsibility placed
on the Auditor General to develop and conduct
training and to provide technical guidance, (emphasis
added) Based on the definition that internal
review is a fundamental element of comptrollership
,
it may be inferred that the Navy Comptroller should
be responsible for the function, but no one in that
office is charged with any such responsibility.
The Chief of Naval Operations has issued no
directives on internal review and no one in his
office has been assigned responsibility for the
function.
The Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps has issued
a directive (MCO 7540. 2A), as have most of the Navy
Systems Commands. These directives provide policy
for implementation of the internal review function
at subordinate activities." /T36:l, 2
_/
The following excerpts from SENCAVINST 7510.8
dated 15 October 1976 clearly show the intention of
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SECNAV that internal review in the USN be decentralized
to the lowest echelon:
"The Internal Review function is designed to
provide Commanders, Commanding Officers, and
Comptrollers with an independent in-house capability
. .
." Z~10:l7
"... Recipient (of funds) Commanders and
Commanding Officers are personally responsible
thereunder for proper funds administration. The
function of Internal Review is implicit in this
responsibility." £"10:17
"It is the policy of the Secretary of the Navy
that an Internal Review function . . . , be
implemented at all appropriate installations and
activities . . ." £"10:1.7
"... the Internal Review function should be
organizationally placed in staff capacity to the
Comptroller or such other official who may be assigned
responsibility for administration of funds. However,
should circumstances so warrant, the organizational
placement of the Internal Review functions should not
preclude direct liaison with the Commander or
Commanding Officer." £"10:17
"The objective of the Internal Review function is
to aid the Commander, Commanding Officer or
Comptroller in their role as funds administrators. . ."
£"10:27
"Resources for execution of the Internal Review
responsibility will be made available from within
available resources." £~ 10:2 J
"Designation of . . . (type of personnel) is a
function ... of each command." £" 10:2 J
" Implementation of the Internal Review function
is a command responsibility ." (emphasis added) [_ 10 : 3 J
The NAVAUDSVC reported that, of the 85 activities
with established internal review functions reviewed, 63,
or over 74 percent, had located the internal review function
organizationally under the local comptroller. £"36:37
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The organizational positions of the internal
review functions in those activities surveyed by the
NAVAUDSVC, that in fact had established internal review
functions, are shown in Figure III-9.
The NAVAUDSVC determined that of the 142 activities
surveyed, 106 (or 75 percent) were of sufficient size and
complexity to require an internal review function. /~36:2_7
Of those activities, 20 percent of them (21 in numbers)
had not established an internal review function. In other
words, based on a sample size of approximately 50 percent,
there is only an 80 percent compliance rate in the USN for
establishing an internal review function when one is in fact
necessary.
In attempting to explain this rate of non-
compliance, the NAVAUDSVC offerred the following:
".
. . it is reasonable to believe that it (non-
compliance) is due to a local command's decision
that the billets or resources that would be required
to expand or establish an internal review program
are not justified, (emphasis added) This may be
due to a failure of the command to understand or
appreciate the benefits that an effective internal
review program can accomplish." /T36:3J7
This discussion has shown that the internal review
function in the USN is totally and intentionally
decentralized. It has also been shown that only approximately
80 percent of those USN activities needing an internal
review function have in fact established one. The NAVAUDSVC






























the benefits of an effective internal review program, and
offered this as a reason for non-compliance decisions by-
local commands. Based on these facts, the NAVAUDSVC
concluded in part: "The policies outlined in SECNAVINST
7510.8 are only being partially accomplished;" ZT36:3_7
and "Many Naval activities have not established an
internal review program ..." /T 36 : 3 J7
3. Staffing
The Secretary of the Navy's implementing
instruction, SECNAVINST 7510.8, states:
"Designation of either qualified full-time, part-
time, or collateral duty personnel for Internal
Review is a function of the size, mission and
complexity of operation of each command ." (emphasis
added) £ 10:2 J
and adds as a separate item:
"Resources for execution of Internal Review
responsibility will be made available from within
available resources." /T10"-2J7
Additional staffing guidance is provided by
Enclosure (2) to SECNAVINST 7510.8 which is entitled:
"Staffing and Training the Internal Review Function."
This policy document states:
"The nucleus of the Internal Review staff should
be an interdisciplinary group collectively possessing
adequate professional proficiency for the tasks
required. This acknowledges temporary assignment
of additional personnel on an ad hoc basis to
provide a particular internal review study.
Typically, the disciplines represented in an
internal review staff would consist of (1) financial
management, and (2) the dominant technical,




The size and complexity of operations of the
individual command will determine the mix and ratio
of the personnel required with respect to grade/rank,
experience/classification, and whether full-time or
part-time/collateral duty." /T 10 :encl. 2 J
Regarding the training of internal review personnel,
SECNAV has stated that, "Proper training is essential for
effective performance and vital to the acquisition of new
skills that are required to audit a broad range of subjects
for the Command." /7 10:encl. 2 J7 SECNAV also envisions a
training function to be performed by the internal review
function itself:
"The Internal Review function provides an invaluable
training ground for development of future financial
management talent , (emphasis added) Consequently,
training should include not only auditing fundamentals
and techniques of critical review and examinations,
but also new areas of management interest such as
use of ADP (automatic data processing) application
for data sampling and data retrieval." £"10:encl. 2 J
In its examination of internal review in the USN
,
the Task Force found that:
"A vast amount of (internal) review is conducted at
smaller activities by people on an ad hoc/collateral
duty basis. Many of these smaller entities conduct
reviews from an audit board concept. These
standing (audit) boards periodically review a
specifically assigned function. One board may review
only the financial soundness of one non-appropriated
fund element (e.g. the Commissioned Officers' Mess,
Open) or another (audit board) review civil timekeeping.
Reports generated in this manner are consistant in
their distribution with the larger more formal
activities." C 11:130 J
For the reader's edification, perhaps the best
and most widely known example of the audit board concept
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is the "Cash Verification Board," which periodically
(monthly and/or quarterly) conducts a surprise examination
of a DON Disbursing Officer's Official accounts. Each
command having an accountable disbursing function is
required by the Comptroller of the Navy Manual, Volume IV
to establish a Cash Verification Board. This manual also
provides explicit directions for both the make-up and
conduct of the board, including sample reports and report
distribution. Membership on this board is a collateral
duty assigned by the local commander.
In its report on internal review in the USN, the
NAVAUDSVC determined that approximately 86 percent of the
personnel assigned to the internal review functions
examined were full-time personnel. £"'36:2 J Of these full
time reviewers, over 98 percent were civilian employees.
£"36:2_7 Part-time reviewers accounted for 14 percent of
the personnel assigned; and approximately 90 percent of
these were also civilian employees. /T36:2J7 Military
personnel accounted for just over 3 percent of all
personnel assigned; and all but one of these were assigned
as heads of their respective functions. /7 36:2J7 I n fact,
only one of the activities surveyed had an internal review




Figures 111-10 and III-ll summarize the internal
review staffing of the activities examined by the NAVAUDSVC.
The statistics shown do not include those personnel
assigned to the internal review function on an ad hoc basis,
or assigned to the various local audit boards.
While the NAVAUDSVC report does not comment
directly on the adequacy of current staffing levels, a
perusal of attachments A through D of the report reveals
several instances of staffing shortages or other problems
purported by the NAVAUDSVC to be examples of "typical
findings" of the reviews conducted. /~ 36 : 3 J7 This leads
one to assume that staffing inadequacies may be considered,
however tenuously, to be to some degree "typical" of
internal review in the USN.
This section has provided the reader with DON's
policy regarding the staffing of the internal review
function; and has summarized the results of the
NAVAUDSVC ? s review. The reader was also introduced to
another much used facet of internal review in the DON, the
audit board concept.
The next section will deal with the performance






















TOTALS 216 100 35 100 78 100
FULL -TIME PART-TIME HEAD
NO. % NO. % NO. %
1 0.5 - - -
1 0.5 1 2.9 -
10 4.6 - - -
- - 1 2.9 -
18 8.3 4 11.4 -
1 0.5 - - -
41 19.0 4 11.4 5 6.4
- - 1 2.9 -
72 33.3 11 31.4 24 30.8
44 20.4 6 17.4 21 26.9
22 10.2 - - 17 21.8
2 0.9 2 5.7 3 3,8
- - 1 2.9 1 1.3
1 0.5 - - -
2 0.9 1 2.9 3 3.8
1 0.5 2 5.7 3 3.8
-
- 1 2.9 1 1.3
GRADES OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED





Totally by full-time civil servants
Full-time civil service and military
Totally by full-time military
Totally by part-time personnel
Full-time civil service supplemented
by part-time personnel
Full-time civil service supplemented
by foreign nationals











SUMMARY OF CHARACTERICTICS OF USN




4 . Work Performance
In summarizing internal review in the USN, the
Task Force offered the following general characterizations
"First, the role assigned naval internal review
personnel varies considerably from one installation
to another. Second, the analyses performed by naval
internal review personnel are primarily limited to the
comptroller area. The Army, by contrast, uses its
internal review personnel to address aspects of all
functional areas within the command." £"11:129.7
The NAVAUDSVC, in its report on internal review
in the USN found that:
"Of the eighty-five activities with established
internal review functions, 41 or 48 percent limited
the internal review staff to audits of non-
appropriated fund activities, payroll functions,
and/or certain financial areas." C 36: 2 J
Regarding the above findings, the NAVAUDSVC
stated that:
"By limiting the scope of the reviews, the
activity also limits their value to management and
fails to meet the objectives of SECNAVINST 7510.8
which emphasizes that internal review is
responsible for examining internal management
controls, practices, and procedures at all levels
to determine adequacy in concept and
effectiveness in application." C 36:2 J
In addition to the above requirements, Enclosure
(1) to SECNAVINST 7510.8 provides the following functions
to be performed by internal review. (paraphrased from
the cited document)
a. Insure that there is provision for financial




b. Audit the civilian timekeeping and payroll
function; and certain non-appropriated fund
activities
.
c. Monitor the correction of deficiencies
revealed by external audits or reviews.
d. Monitor and critique the design and
installation of financial and accounting systems
and procedures, with emphasis upon the
identification and use of valid audit trails and
other management controls.
e. Provide advice and review the use of quality
control and other effectiveness indicators for
financial management and resource use.
f. Design and apply audit check lists for areas
unique and/or critical to the local command.
g. Review safeguards or refinements to existing
controls for material and financial accountability.
h. Review the proper execution of various
directed programs.
i. Review other problem areas, as directed.
j . Render advice on matters of organization and
staffing within comptroller areas.
k. Maintain liaison with and provide assistance
to external audit, inspection and/or review groups.
Regarding the actual conduct of internal review and
also its follow-up role, Enclosures (3) and (4) to
SECNAVINST 7510.8 provide the following salient points:
a. Internal reviews should be conducted in a manner
that will minimize disruption to normal operations.
b. Internal reviews should be comprehensieve




c. An initial meeting with operating officials
should be held prior to beginning a review, with the
objective of explaining the purpose, scope, and
estimated duration of the review.
d. Responsible officials and operating personnel
should be kept fully informed during the course of a
review and should normally be given the opportunity
to comment on findings as they are developed.
e. The scope of a review should include a
determination of:
1. compliance with established policies and
procedures
,
2. the reliability of records and reports,
3. the validity of supporting documentation
affecting known or suspected problems, and
4. the effectiveness of the operations
reviewed.
f. Statistical sampling techniques should be used
where possible, in order to both improve the quality
of internal reviews and reduce the workload impact
upon operating personnel.
g. An exit conference should be held with responsible
operating officials to discuss findings and the report
content.
h. The comments of responsible operating officials
during the course of the review and at the exit
conference should be considered in preparing the
report
.
i. The internal review documentation should
include the preparation of working papers which
clearly indicate not only the subject areas reviewed
but also the purpose, scope, source of data, reviewer,
and conclusions of the review.
j . Line management should be given the opportunity
to review the facts to be presented in the report for
completeness and accuracy.
k. All internal review reports should be submitted





1. Each approved audit or resource-related inspection
recommendation requiring corrective action should be
identified for subsequent follow up.
m. The follow up should be continued until all
recommended actions are completed.
n. The follow up should determine the extent and
effectiveness of corrective actions.
o. Records should be maintained to document
follow-up action.
p. The liaison and follow-up responsibilities of
the internal review function also include all
actions and command correspondence related to
external audits and resource-related reviews.
q. Care should be exercised to insure that the
internal review function does not become one
where record-keeping and monitoring subvert
the primary purpose of reviewing command
operations
.
Regarding the overall work ethic of the internal
review function, SECNAVINST 7510.8 provides the
following guidance:
a. The planning and programming of internal reviews
should be subject to periodic (e.g. semiannual)
command review and approved insofar as practicable.
r 10:2 7
b. Flexible scheduling is necessary to permit
special reviews that are responsive to changing
circumstances. /~10:2J7
c. Internal review should complement but not
intentionally duplicate the responsibilities of
centralized audit organization. Z~"10:2J7
d. The reviews performed should be conducted in
such an independent, thorough, detailed, and
professional manner as to minimize the necessity
for duplicative reviews by external audit




e. The internal review function should, as a
first priority, always serve command. £"10:2 J
f. The follow-up program is an important element
of internal review; however, the primary responsibility
for implementing approved recommendations of internal
review or external audit rests with line
management. £~10:2_7
In summarizing their findings on internal review in
the USN for purposes of a conclusion, the NAVAUDSVC stated:
"The policies outlined in SECNAVINST 7510.8 are
only being partially accomplished. Many Naval
activities have not established an internal review
program and many of those that have, limit the
scope of the internal review staff to areas not
directly related to mission accomplishment." £"36:3J7
To support this conclusion, the NAVAUDSVC report
contains four attachments referred to in the body of the
report as: "typical findings written during these
reviews (of 142 Naval activities)." £"36:3^7 Prior to
briefly paraphrasing these "typical findings" as further
illustrations of the status of internal review in the USN,
the significance of the term "typical" must be established.
Webster defines the word "typical" as: "combining or
exhibiting the essential characteristics of a group."
ZT23:1266_7 Therefore, the following characterizations
were chosen by the NAVAUDSVC to be representative of the
USN's internal review program as a whole and in general.
Only the salient points are presented here as the reader
has previously been provided with discussions on the
possible results of ineffective internal review.
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a. "NAS (Naval Air Station) does not have an
operational internal review function." ^7 36 : A- 1 _7
b. "NAS had previously requested that an internal
review billet be established, but CNAVRES (Chief
of Naval Reserve) , because of resource limitations
declined the request." £"36:A-1^7
c. "Our (NAVAUDSVC s) review disclosed vulnerable
(to fraud and abuse) operational areas that are
not being periodically reviewed." /7 36:B-1_7
d. "The activity's internal review function is
almost exclusively limited to auditing non-
appropriated funds and performing fund
reconcilations . Audit boards are available to
assist in reviews of non-appropriated activities
but are not fully utilized." £Zb:C-lJ
e. "Local instructions list personnel required
to assist internal review in the audits of non-
appropriated funds. However, we (NAVAUDSVC) have
been informed that they are not being used."
£ 36:C-1J
f. "During our (NAVAUDSVC s) review we also noted
that internal review workpapers were incomplete
and disorganized. Workpapers were not indexed and
did not clearly indicate the subject reviewed,
sources, purpose, scope, and conclusions." /7 36:C-1_7
g. "The NAVAUDSVC has developed an internal review
training plan which outlines training courses that
should be taken by internal review personnel in
order to successfully perform internal review
functions. A review of the training files of
internal review personnel revealed that training in
these areas has not been received." £~36:C-1_7
h. "We (NAVAUDSVC) believe that management needs to
improve its attitude toward Internal Review operations
We reviewed nine audit reports . . . and found that
no responses were received for three reports and the
response time ranged from 1 to almost 5 months for
the other six reports. During our recent audits of
other functional areas we identified some of the same
deficiencies that have previously been identified by
Internal Review. If management had been receptive
to Internal Review's recommendations, we believe




i. "The overall effectiveness of the Internal
Review Division has been hampered by a lack of
continuity in leadership. Since its inception in
1972, Internal Review had had eight Military
Directors whose tenures have averaged only 9
months." £"36:D-lJ7
j. "Internal Review personnel lack the
training to equip themselves to adequately
perform reviews of certain functional areas, such
as, appropriation accounting, non-appropriated
funds, procurement, supply, etc, Furthermore, no
formal training plans have been formulated for
the Internal Review Division." £~36:D-1_7
k. "We (NAVAUDSVC) noted deficiencies in
accounting for audit man-hours, controlling
audits, and audit planning." /T36:D-2_7
1. "Internal Review does not perform pre-audit
surveys of functional areas, as a result, man-
hours are not expended wisely." /T36:D-2_7
m. "In many cases, working papers were inadequate,
randomly placed in review folders, and difficult
to understand without supplementary explanations
from the preparer." ZT36:D-3_7
n. "Although some effort has been initiated in
audit follow up, adequate procedures have not
been implemented to ensure that corrective action
is taken on internal and external audit
recommendations." /7 36:D-3_7
o. "We (NAVAUDSVC) believe that one of the primary
problems in Internal Review is that the auditors
feel that management is not responsive to their
recommendations, therefore, 'why bother 1 ." /T36:D-3J7
5. Summary
In summary, this section has provided the reader
with the existing guidelines concerning the work of
internal review in the USN. These guidelines cover not
only the functions to be performed by internal review but
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also the actual conduct of a review, the follow-up role
to be performed, and the overall work ethic of the
internal review function.
The reader has been provided "typical" audit
findings by the NAVAUDSVC in support of their stated
conclusion that internal review in the USN is only
partially accomplishing the established policies. These
"typical" findings have illuminated deficiencies in such
areas as existence, staffing, training, audit coverage,
audit control and documentation, follow-up action,
motivation, and command support. In short, deficiencies
have been identified in almost every area which bears on
the effectiveness of internal review in the USN.
The reader may now conclude that, since (a)
effectiveness is the relationship between an organization's
output (work performance) and its established policies and
goals ZT8:5J, and since (b) the NAVAUDSVC has shown that
internal review in the USN is only partially accomplishing
its policies and goals /736:3_7; internal review in the
USN may be properly described as ineffective.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the reader with evidential
matter concerning the status of internal review in the DOD.
The reader has been exposed to the differing
organizations, staffing levels, and performance policies
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extant in the DOD. The chapter has discussed the
diversity of internal review organizational structures and
locations, which range from the totally centralized CAP of
the DAF, through the decentralized but hierarchical internal
review structure of the DA, to the totally decentralized
structure of internal review in the DON.
The reader has been provided staffing data concerning
internal review in the DOD; and has been shown the widely
differing staffing levels which exist. These staffing
levels, presented in Figure III-2, range from the 1,108
internal review personnel in the DA, through the 547 DON
internal review personnel, to the 53 man-years actually
expended by the DAF.
The performance policies prescribed by the various
departments have been shown to vary from the broad
mandates of the DA and DON to the somewhat limited nature
of the DAF's CAP.
The actual work performance of the various internal
review functions has been shown to be deficient in many
areas; to the extent of being described by several
reviewing bodies as ineffective. These deficiencies
include deficiencies in scope, staffing, training, audit
coverate, follow-up action, and command support among
others
.
Conversely, both the role and perceived importance of
the internal review function have been shown to be
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increasing in the eyes of DOD financial managers at the
highest echelons and departmental levels. This situation,
in the author's opinion, demands a total and complete
strategical rethink of the internal review function; from
its goals and objectivies, to its staffing levels and work
performance. This view was also expounded by The Task
Force, which provided 38 recommendations for the improvement
of audit, inspection and investigative components of the
DOD. ZT37:Encl. 1J
As the author perceives it, DOD's situation regarding
internal review is similar to a Board of Directors or a
Chief Executive Officer in the private sector examining a
facet of their organization which is not productive or not
measuring up to its potential. Under the glaring scrutiny
of the profit measure, these responsible managers must
first review and reaffirm strategic plans such as:
"deciding on the goals of the organization and on the
broad strategies that are to be used in attaining these
goals;" ZT 8 : 2 J7 before deciding the management and
operational controls to be implemented.
Translating this analogy into the DOD's situation,
those responsible for establishing policy must first
re-examine the essence and essential purpose of internal
review and determine whether or not to continue; and if so,
in what mode. From the comments of DOD policy makers such
as the one by RADM Frost provided earlier, it appears that
just such a re-evaluation has been performed, with the
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outcome being a decision to continue. The next step in
the analogy then, is to determine the various management
and operational controls to be implemented and enforced.
These controls are such things as the "rules, procedures,
forms and other devices that govern the performance of
specific tasks;" C 8 : 2 J and "The process by which
management assures that the organization carries out
its strategies effectively and efficiently." /T 8 : 3 J7"
These controls then, involve the organizational structure
and location of the internal review function as well as its
scope, staffing, training, and work performance guidelines.
As both a final summary of this chapter and as a
prelude to the next chapter's analysis of several
alternative methods for providing the controls cited above,
the reader is asked to recall the "internal review balance
sheet" introduced at the beginning of this chapter. Through
the application of this tool, the reader can make a subjective
determination of the effectiveness of internal review in
each of the uniformed services; and also gain insight into
the alternatives presented in the next chapter.
It should be re-emphasized at this point, that the
determinations are subjective in nature and macro in scope.
Much of the ranking relies on the reader's intuition, even
when the conclusion appears to be obvious and has been





The characteristics of internal review discussed in
Chapter II on page 53 form the basis for comparison of
the various department's programs; and the categories of
sufficient number of personnel assigned, and overall work
performance have been added.
The rating method is simple and direct; but as pointed
out above, intuitive. Each department's internal review
program was restudied; and based on the previous discussions
a rating of -1, 0, or +1 was given using the following
criteria:
1. Asset - a numerical score of +1 was given if
the characteristic was definitely extant in the
subject program. For example, a decentralized
function is more responsive to local command than
a centralized one. This is intuitively obvious,
even if the section on internal review in the
DAF had not provided evidence to show the DAF's
CAP was not responsive.
2. Liability - a numerical score of -1 was given
if the characteristic was definitely not extant in
the subject program. For example, a decentralized
function organizationally placed subordinate to
the local comptroller is decidedly less
independent in appearance, if not in fact, than a
centralized function. Again, this is intuitive even
if the section on internal review in the USMC had
not provided evidence of this perception.
3. Zero balance - a numerical score of was given
if the characteristic was ambivalent, or if
mitagating circumstances existed. For example, the
decentralized nature of internal review in the DA
gives a perception of non- independence ; but its
hierarchical structure provides a counteracting




For the purposes of this comparison, each
characteristic was assumed to be of equal importance.
Accordingly, the numerical scores were simply summed and
averaged to provide a composite measure of the
"effectiveness account" balance in the equation: ASSETS -
LIABILITIES = EFFECTIVENESS. This composite measure of
effectiveness has a possible range of -1 to +1; which may
be interpreted as ranging from ineffective (-1) to
effective (+1) . In between these two scalar values, lies
an area probably best described in the vernacular as gray.
If the author may be permitted a pun on Naval jargon, haze
gray is not squared away, at least in this instance.
Although not empiracally based or truly comparable to
regression analysis, a general rule of thumb may be
borrowed to interpret the gray area between the scalar
minimum and maximum. The composite measure derived above
is actually a percentage measure of the scalar distance
from the benchmark of to the numerical score obtained by
the particular program under review. This may be equated




which measures the percentage of variance in a dependent
variable explained by a change in an independent variable.
The general rule of thumb usually applied is that a value
of 0.7 or more is significant. In other words, a score of
0.7 or more can be said to be either significantly effective





As shown by Figure 111-12, none of the internal
review programs in the DOD should be considered significantly-
effective or ineffective. The DA's internal review program
comes the closest to being rated as effective. The DAF's
CAP is the lowest ranked; and the only program receiving
a negative score. The DON's programs are ranked very close
to the benchmark, indicating the sensitive nature of the
ratings received by these programs. In other words, a
negative shift in the rating of one or two characteristics
would result in negative scores for these programs.
In the final analysis, it appears that none of the
DOD's internal review programs are in fact effective.
However, the DA's program appears to be the most effective
subsequent to both the narrative evaluation and the
subjective ranking.
The next chapter will provide the reader with several
alternatives for the organization and conduct of internal
review; and attempt to analyze them with the objective of
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TOTAL + 7 -5 +1 + 2
COMPOSITE EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE .539 -.385 .077 .154
NUMERICAL RANKING 1 4 3 2






IV. ANALYSIS OF CENTRALIZATION/DECENTRALIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have provided the reader with
the historical development of auditing in general and of
the internal review function in particular. The reader has
been presented detailed background material on the
establishment, objectives, and status of the internal
review function in the Department of Defense (DOD)
.
It has been shown that the organization of the internal
review function within the DOD varies from the totally-
centralized Commander's Audit Program (CAP) of the
Department of the Air Force (DAF) , to the decentralized
but hierarchical internal review program of the Department
of the Army (DA) , to the totally decentralized internal
review programs of the Department of the Navy (DON)
.
A subjective analysis of the status of the various DOD
internal review programs has shown that while none were
either significantly effective or ineffective, the DA
program was rated the most effective; and the DAF program
was rated the least effective.
It is the author's contention that, notwithstanding
the incontrovertible requirements of proper training,
sufficient staffing, personnel expertise, definition of
and adherence to work performance guidelines, and other
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so-called "hard" or "measurable" requirements, the pivotal
factor for an effective internal review function in the DOD
is proper organization, including the precise definition of
all attendant relationships. Victor Z. Brink has summed
up the pervasive nature of this factor by stating:
"... there is however, a central question: what
priorities should be given to serving corporate
management (local commanders) versus serving the
board of directors (higher echelons)?" (emphasis
added) ZT15:29_7
The answer accorded this question, leads one to the
type of organization necessary to yield the desired
results
.
In this chapter, the author will seek to answer the
question posed above; and also provide the reader with an
analysis of several alternative organizational schemes,
with the objective of determining which scheme provides
the best prospect for obtaining an effective internal
review function in the DON.
B. PROBLEM
In a classical cost-benefit analysis, the problem
statement is typically an interrogative expression of the
choice to be made, such as "which weapon system should be
acquired."
In this analysis, the problem statement may be stated:
"how to obtain an effective internal review function in
the DON?" This statement assumes that a strategic
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decision concerning the internal review function has
already been made. As shown in Chapter III, one may assume
this to be the case from the remarks of high DON policy
makers such as RADM Frost, SC, USN, acting Comptroller of
the Navy (NAVCOMPT)
.
Therefore, given that an internal review function will
exist, the objective of the analysis is to determine what
is the best method of obtaining an "effective" internal
review function.
C. ALTERNATIVES
Regarding the question posed in the introduction to
this chapter, Victor Z. Brink has stated:
"There are various sets of arrangements (alternatives)
which could, in some way, separate or integrate
these priorities. Those alternative arrangements
extend from solely serving corporate management
(total decentralization) to solely serving the
board (centralized audit function) , with various
intermediate combinations." ,7715:2917
"Between the two alternatives of exclusive
service to corporate officers or the audit committee
(board of directors) there is a spectrum of
possibilities
.
. . . primary responsibility to the corporate
management with a defined secondary responsibility
to the audit committee.
. . . primary responsibility to the audit
committee and a defined secondary responsibility to
corporate management.




For the purposes of this analysis, the alternatives
to be considered are:
1. A totally decentralized function solely serving
and reporting to the local commander.
2. A totally centralized function solely serving
and reporting to higher level management.
3. A function primarily serving and reporting to
the local commander, with some defined secondary
responsibility to higher management.
4. A function primarily serving and reporting to
higher management, with some defined secondary
responsibility to the local commander.
5. A function with equal responsibility to both
higher management and the local commander.
D. CRITERION OF CHOICE
The criterion to be used for deciding which alternative
should be selected as best achieving the objective of the
analysis, is one of maximum effectiveness.
This criterion was chosen because the need for an
effective internal review function, as shown in previous
chapters, is being increasingly recognized and given
priority status in the DOD and the Federal Government in
general.
The criterion of cost is considered by the analysis
only when the implementation of a particular alternative
will tend to result in a duplication of the internal
review function. This is done for two reasons. One, as
alternative which results in a duplication of effort is
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by definition not as efficient as one which achieves the
objective without duplication; and two, as stated by
NAVCOMPT: "... a good internal review staff will more
than pay for itself." £"30: 2 J
Therefore, in the first case, the alternative which
results in a duplication of effort to achieve the same end
is eliminated through inefficiency; and in the second case,
the cost of the alternative is assumed to be irrelevant.
E. EFFECTIVENESS
Effectiveness has been previously defined in this
thesis as the relationship between the outputs of an
organization and the goals or objectives of that
organization. In the private sector, the profit measure
is a classical example. Assuming that the organization is
not a non-profit one, the profit measure is a concise
indicator of the effectiveness of the organization's
operations. Although the private sector organization may
have other, additional goals such as increasing existing
market share of developing new products for new markets,
the so-called "bottom line" is profit.
Unfortunately, no such concise measure exists for
determining the effectiveness of an internal review
function. This problem is not unique to internal review;
and literally books have been written on the subject of
measuring the effectiveness of organizations in which
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either or both the outputs or objectives cannot be
accurately or objectively measured. One such book by
Anthony and Herzlinger, entitled Management Control in
Nonprofit Organizations /"" 8 J is recommended by the
author and forms the basis for much of this section.
In order to measure the effectiveness of an internal
review function, one must resort to surrogate measures.
Anthony has defined surrogate measures in a circuitous
fashion by stating:
"In the ideal situation, the objective is stated in
measurable terms, and the output measure is stated
in these same terms. When this relationship is not
feasible, as is often the case, the output measure
represents the closest feasible way of measuring
the accomplishment of an objective that cannot
itself be expressed quantitatively. Such a measure
is called a "surrogate" or a "proxy." C 8:232 J
One must be careful in the use of surrogate measures.
Anthony has stated that if the lack of correspondence
between the objective and the surrogate is not recognized,
the organization may focus too much attention on the
surrogate. /T 8 : 2 50 J7 This dysfunction may even extend to
the point where achieving the surrogate becomes more
important than achieving the objective. /T 8 : 2 50 J7 Anthony
continues the discussion of surrogates by providing four
examples of organizations which invested the means of
achieving an objective with the end of actually achieving
the objective. O 8:250, 251 J It is interesting, for
purposes of this thesis, to note that all four examples are
of governmental agencies or programs.
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The surrogate measures of effectiveness to be used
by the analysis will basically be the characteristics of
effective internal review described in Chapter II. The
assumption being, that if an alternative exhibits those
characteristics, it will tend to be effective rather
than ineffective; especially when contrasted to another
alternative which does not exhibit those characteristics.
At this point in the discussion, the reader may well
be pondering the thought of "what about the operative
requirements such as staffing, training, or performance
guidelines?" As stated previously, these requirements are
incontrovertible. The answer however, is in the question
itself. These are operative requirements, necessary for
the internal review function to achieve its objectives once
in operation. Without the proper staffing, training, etc.,
there is obviously little prospect for an internal review
function to be effective in whatever form. In researching
material for this thesis, the conclusions of various studies
echoed each other in stating that staffing was insufficient
and/or poorly trained; and that work performance was
inadequate. Likewise, the recommendations usually
counselled increased staffing, more training, and the
observance of extablished guidelines. The organization of
an internal review function does not alter these require-
ments. However, as exemplified by the DAF's CAP, the
organization of an internal review function does have a
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direct bearing on its use, or nonuse by the local commander
In the author's opinion the point to be made is that to be
effective, the internal review function must first be
employed. Only then, do the requirements of staffing,
training, etc. become relevant to the analysis. Perhaps
a good summary is a colloquial one from the game of poker:
"You can't win if you aren't in; but you surely can lose
your ante."
Therefore, the analysis will concentrate on the
characteristics previously listed; and attempt to measure
each alternatives' propensity for exhibiting each
alternative.
The system of measurement will be that employed in
Chapter III. A numerical score of -1, or +1 will be
assigned to each characteristic for each alternative. The
alternative receiving the highest positive total score will
be judged to be the alternative best capable of obtaining
an effective internal review function, in concert with the
operative requirements previously discussed in this section
and in Chapter III.
F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
1 . First Order Analysis
The first step in the evaluation, is to seek any
alternative which may be dismissed for obvious reasons.
Therefore, the alternatives will first be reviewed briefly
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to see if such a condition exists. The brief analysis
provided for each alternative is that of Victor Z. Brink,
a charter member of the Institute of Internal Auditors (HA) ;
and a recognized authority in the field of internal auditing.
Dr. Brink's remarks are slightly paraphrased from his
article in the December, 1978 issue of The Internal Auditor
,
entitled: "Internal Auditing: A Historical Perspective
and Future Directions." ZTlS-7
a. Alternative 1
A totally decentralized function solely serving
and reporting to the local commander.
The merit of this arrangement is that the
local commander can use the internal review group to fully
serve his or her own managerial needs - free from outside
restrictions. Under such conditions, internal review's
emphasis would be primarily on operational auditing plus
whatever financial auditing activities local management
believes it needs to discharge its responsibilities to
higher authority or are required by higher authority.
However, higher authority would, presumably,
have to make greater use of the centralized internal audit
function to care for their needs or, alternatively,
create a new audit group (a higher echelon internal review
function?) to provide some of the needed services.
Since nothing in the analysis above is




A totally centralized function solely serving
and reporting to higher level management
Under this alternative, the internal review
group would primarily protect the responsibilities of the
higher authority and would concentrate on the traditional
functions of compliance, protection, and integrity.
Under this arrangement however, the role of
the internal reviewer would more closely approximate that
of the external auditor. There might also be conflict
between the work of internal reviewers and the operating
organization because internal reviewers, to a considerable
extent, would be checking on local management for higher
authority.
Presumably, internal reviewers would take on
a more powerful protective role. In so doing, they could
directly or indirectly undermine, or even give up, a major
stake in operational auditing. It is also likely - if not
inevitable - that local management would seek to obtain
operational auditing services from another organizational
component or that it would create an entirely new group to
do in-house operational audits.
The reader will recall from the discussion of
the DAF's CAP, that this duplication of effort is actually
taking place in the DAF.
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Accordingly, this alternative is dismissed
for reasons of inefficiency and duplication of effort as
defined in the criterion for choice,
c. Alternative 3
A function primarily serving and reporting to
the local commanders, with some defined secondary
responsibility to higher level management.
Under this alternative, the role of internal
review to local management would stay much the same as in
Alternative 1. The dotted-line responsibility to higher
level management would, presumable, include periodic
reporting - both in writing and in person - and immediate
communication between parties as deemed necessary.
The stated responsibilities would probably
define particular levels of required disclosure.
The advantages are that each interested party
might be able to get everything it needed in the way of
services without restricting the control required by local
management for achieving effective operations.
The disadvantages are that there might still
be some conflict of interest between management and higher
authority and that higher authority might feel that it was
not getting enough protection from the internal review
group to satisfy its expanding needs.
Since nothing in the analysis above is




A function primarily serving and reporting to
higher management, with some defined secondary-
responsibility to the local commander.
Under this alternative, the higher level
management would be in top control. This alternative more
fully satisfies governmental pressures for strong
safeguards. It would, however, have the disadvantage of
tending to restrict local management in its use of internal
reviewers in areas of operational auditing. There could
also be some hostility generated between local management
and higher authority. The benefits to internal reviewers
would be that they would retain ties with both groups. At
the same time, it would pose questions as to whether they
could adequately discharge both audit roles. Again, local
management might feel the need for a new audit group it
could more effectively control.
Again, the reader will recall the DAF's CAP;
and its support by example of the analysis presented above.
Since this alternative differs only in degree from
Alternative 2, it is also dismissed for reasons of
inefficiency and duplication of effort as defined in the
criterion of choice.
e. Alternative 5
A function with equal responsibility to both
higher management and the local commander.
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This alternative appears, on the surface, to
be attractive because it asserts full service of internal
reviewers to both parties of interest. The major problem
here, however, is whether this organizational arrangement
is sound or even realistic. Can an internal review group
function under two administrators? Admittedly, there are
some situations where this has been tried with reasonable
success. The project team, with dual responsibilities
of the member to the project manager and to the department
from which he or she has been assigned, is one example.
However, in such a situation, there is a higher level of
organizational authority which is reasonably available to
directly or indirectly resolve any major conflict. It is
doubtful whether a higher-level arbiter exists between
local management and higher authority, in any practical
sense.
Even though the concept of equal joint
responsibility may sound like a good solution, there is
considerable doubt as to whether it is satisfactory for all
parties, including internal reviewers.
Accordingly, this alternative is dismissed for
the same reasons as alternatives 2 and 4.
f . Summary
The first order analysis has eliminated all
but two alternatives from further consideration. The
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reasons of inefficiency, duplication of effort, and
practical unworkability are supported by evidence
contained in the discussion of the DAF's CAP; and by the
statements and opinions of Victor Z. Brink. A summary of
the tendencies of the three eliminated alternatives is
provided by Dr. Brink in his article cited above:
"On balance, it appears - at least to me - that
. . . (higher authority) cannot effectively take
over the role of . . . (local management) . If
they do, they will need full-time people of the
caliber of today's . . . (local commanders).
In such a situation, the present . . . (local
commanders) would become . . . (higher managers)
and simply have new titles. In that case however,
we would need a new group to monitor . . .
(higher authority) in discharging their greater
operational responsibilities - a kind of superboard.
Thus we would be back about where we started."
ZT15:32J7
In addition to the "full circle" affect
described by Dr. Brink above, other reasons have been
expounded against the centralized approach to the internal
review function. For example, The Task Force on
Evaluation of Audit, Inspection and Investigative Components
of the Department of Defense (Task Force) concluded that
the DAF's CAP and a similar centralized appropach proposed
by a joint study group within the DOD "might increase the
likelihood that the audit services available to local
commanders will be undertaken by qualified and competent
auditors." £"11:139 J However, The Task Force continued
by stating: O 11 : 139-145J
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"In our opinion (The Task Force), however, these
benefits (of centralization) would come at an unduly-
high price because the Air Force's Commander's Audit
Program and the similar proposal advanced by the
Joint Study Group would not fulfill important needs
of local commanders for the following reasons:
1. Commanders would be forced to rely on
other staff advisors for many of the services
currently provided by internal review . . .
2. The internal audit components are
increasingly providing less attention to the
audit needs of local commanders . . .
3. The trend away from the local commander's
audit concerns would not be reversed by merging
internal review and internal audit . . .
4. The need for more financial audits would
nto be served by the proposal . . .
5. Commanders would be reluctant to request
local audit assistance from internal audit
organizations
.
As a final argument in support of dismissing
the centralization alternatives, the author offers that the
definition and intended purpose of the internal review -
function previously provided to the reader are to provide
audit and investigate capability to the local commander.
A proposal to centralize the internal review function would
in effect remove the direction and control of the function
from the local commander and place them under some authority
higher than the local commander. This would have the
practical effect, in the author's opinion, of adding an
additional overs ignt agency reporting on the local
commander to some higher authority - at least from the
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local commander's viewpoint. The logical practical outcome
of such an action, would be the lowered utilization of
such a centralized function by the local commander; as
evidenced by the DAF's CAP, and the attendant comments by
DAF local commanders which have been previously provided.
The Task Force referred to this characteristic
as providing the local commander with "assistance without
advertising his or her problems." The author chooses to
express it in less academic but perhaps more graphic
terms familiar to most military managers. It is simply the
survival instinct; and a cardinal rule of survival is
"not to put oneself on report."
Therefore, while the centralization alternatives
obviously have merits, it is the author's opinion, as
supported by The Task Force, that not only would centraliza-
tion remove the internal review function from the direction
and control of the local commander contrary to current
definition; but also it would result in lowered usage of
the formal function.
2. Second Order Analysis
The remaining two alternatives are actually
differing degrees of decentralization. Alternative 1
proposes a totally decentralized internal review system,
comparable to the current DON internal review function;
and Alternative 3 proposes a modified version similar to
the current DA internal review function.
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In evaluating two similar alternatives, the first
step is to eliminate those factors of the analysis which
are, in effect, the same for both alternatives. The
analysis can then concentrate on those evaluation factors
which are different; and thus relevant to the analysis.
Accordingly, because of the decentralized
organization of both alternatives, the evaluation factors
of responsiveness, ready availability, unduplicatibility
,
focus on command's problems, flexibility, accumulation
of corporate knowledge, and solution orientation were
judges by the author to be approximately equal for both
alternatives. This judgement was based on the definitions
provided for these characteristics in Chapter II when
viewed from a decentralized perspective.
The remaining evaluation factors of independence,
analytical skill, assistance without advertising, and
streamlining of other audit work are discussed below.
a. Independence
As previously stated, the appearance of
independence is viewed by the auditing profession as being
as equally important as actual independence. From this
standpoint, it is obvious that an internal review function
organizationally located subordinate to a local commander
will not appear to outside observers as independent. This
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statement is supported by Robert H. White, CIA, in his
article "Can Government Auditors Be Independent?" Mr.
White states:
"The presumption of independence is considerably-
weakened, in my view, in the employee - employer
relationship and evidence sufficient to offset
this loss would have to be available, in the case
of government, to all government constituents."
/" 35:41_7
In the case of Alternative 1, no such evidence
is available to offset the perception of non- independence
.
In Alternative 3, the existance of clearly defined
secondary responsibilities to higher authority including
as Dr. Brink envisioned " periodic reporting" and "immediate
communication between parties;" serves to mitigate to some
extent the perception of non- independence. Accordingly,
Alternative 1 is given a numerical score of -1; indicating
the lack of apparent independence. Alternative 3 is given
a numerical score of 0, indicating the mitigating effects
of the secondary responsibilities to higher authority.
The numerical scores of each alternative will
be displayed at the conclusion of the evaluation,
b. Analytical Skill
On the surface, the alternatives would not
appear to differ on this factor. However, the secondary
responsibilities to higher authority of Alternative 3 are
assumed by the author to include professional guidance
and technical oversignt as exist in the DA's internal
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review system. The existance of formal oversight by-
professional auditors as to the technical qualifications
and development of internal review personnel in Alternative
3 as opposed to unenforced guidelines in Alternative 1;
would tend to product more analytically skilled auditors in
the long run. The Task Force found this to be the case
when comparing internal review in the DA with internal
review in the DON; and stated:
"Thus, unlike the Army, there is no requirement
that naval internal review personnel possess any
audit-related background or that they comply with
auditing standards in the performance of their
duties." £"11:128.7
Therefore, Alternative 1 is given a numerical
score of -1; based on the historical evidence which indicates
the tendency of a totally decentralized function,
unsupervised by other professionals, to neglect the
requisites of professional status and analytical training.
Alternative 3 is given a numerical score of +1
for this factor. This is also based on the historical
data presented by The Task Force, which indicates that the
modified decentralized function does tend to better
recognize and provide for professional and analytical skill.
11:1357
c. Assistance Without Advertising
For this factor, the totally decentralized
function tends to offer a better opportunity than does
the modified function with secondary responsibility to
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higher authority. From the discussion at the end of the
first evaluation section, this should be obvious to the
reader. A function totally under the direction and
control of a local commander is obviously less apt to
"advertise," than is one which has formal direct
communication to higher authority including periodic
reporting.
The reader is reminded of the discussion of
this characteristic in Chapter II, which cautioned against
the interpretation of this characteristic in the context of
a "cover up." That discussion stated that one should
construe the meaning as providing the local commander the
ability to identify and correct problem areas without being
subjected to additional scrutiny and criticism.
Therefore, Alternative 1 is given a numerical
score of +1 for this factor. A numerical score of is-
given to Alternative 3 because, although the tendency to
"advertise" is greater, the function is still under the
direction and control of the local commander. Also, it
is assumed that some sort of guidelines such as those
«
extant in the DA's internal review program, would exist,
detailing the "mandatory" disclosures; and that the local
commander would exercise control over all others,
d. Streamlines Other Audit Effort
The rating for this factor is in reality a
function of the factors of independence and analytical
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skill. The definition of this factor refers to the ability
of other auditors to "build on" the work of the internal
review function, rather than duplicate it. This "building
on," cannot be accomplished until the other auditors are
first satisfied as to the extent and reliability of the
work of the internal review function. Since the characteris
tics of independence and analytical skill, when positive in
nature, tend to support the reliability of the internal
review function's findings, and the depth of the analysis
used to discover and support those findings; it is logical
to assume that the alternative exhibiting these two factors
the strongest would also tend to better streamline other
audit effort. A review of these two evaluation factors,
reveals that Alternative 1 received a cumulative score of
-2; and that Alternative 3 received a total score of +1.
Accordingly, Alternative 1 is given a numerical
score of -1 for this evaluation factor. This stands to
reason, because neither of the other two ratings contribute
in a positive manner to providing confidence in the internal
review function to an outside auditor.
Alternative 3 is given a numerical rating of 0,
because the positive nature of the analytical skill factor
offsets or mitigates the ambivalent appearance of
independence. These, in the author's opinion, combine to
produce an atmosphere in which an outside auditor would be
more confident of the reliability and extent of the
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internal review effort, than the same auditor would be of
the internal review effort of the totally decentralized
function.
e . Summary
The second cut has shown the two alternatives
to be approximately equal in seven of the eleven
evaluation factors, due to the decentralized nature of both
alternatives
.
In the other four evaluation factors, the
alternatives were rated as follows:
Alternative 1 Alternative 5
Independence -1
Analytical Skill -1 +1
Assistance without advertising +1
Streamline other audit effort -1
TOTAL -2 +1
G . SUMMARY
Based on the measure of effectiveness and criterion
of choice defined in this chapter, the results of the
analysis indicate that Alternative 3 offers the best
propsect for obtaining an effective internal review
function.
This indication was derived by an analysis conducted
in the style of a typical cost/benefit analysis. The
author first presented the contention which led to the
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analysis; and then provided the reader with the problem
statement and objective of the analysis. The five
alternatives to be evaluated were identified; and the
criterion of choice defined and explained. The use of
surrogate measures for effectiveness was discussed; and
the evaluation factors to be used in the analysis were
identified.
The author explained why such measures as sufficient
staffing, proper training, etc., were not considered by
the analysis. The method of evaluation was defined; and
the basis for decision established.
The analysis itself consisted of two parts, a "first-
order analysis'* and a "second-order analysis." In the
first-order analysis, the objective was to eliminate any
alternative which could be eliminated based on obvious
reasons. Using a brief analysis performed by Victor Z."
Brink as evidence, the first cut resulted in the
elimination of three "centralization" alternatives.
The second-order analysis of the analysis concentrated
on four evaluation criteria, since the other seven factors
were judged to be approximately equal for both
alternatives
.
The outcome of the second-order analysis indicates, as
stated earlier, that Alternative 3 - a function primarily
serving and reporting to the local commander, with some
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defined secondary responsibility to higher management -
offers the best prospect for obtaining an effective
internal review function, when performed in concert with
the operative requirements of staffing, training, etc.
The next chapter will further discuss the alternative
selected; and attempt to define the "secondary responsibility
to higher management." Lastly, the chapter will provide




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The stated purpose of this thesis was to determine
the best method of accomplishing internal review in the
U.S. Navy (USN) . The objectives established in Chapter I
to achieve this purpose were to:
1. Determine the degree of compliance with current
directives and preferred practices in the USN.
2. Determine the underlying causes of non-
compliance .
3. Examine alternatives to improve the
effectiveness of internal review.
4. Make recommendations as to which alternative
offers the best probability of increasing the
effectiveness of internal review in the USN.
In accomplishing these objectives, Chapter III provided
the current status of the internal review function in each
of the four military components of the Department of
Defense (DOD) . Chapter III identified deficiencies in the
scope, staffing, training, audit coverage, follow-up action,
command support, and other areas of the various DOD internal
review functions.
Chapter III also presented the findings and opinions of
The Task Force and the Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC) as
to the reasons for non-compliance with current directives.
One such opinion by the NAVAUDSVC, was that some local
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commanders decided that the resources required to expand
or establish an internal review function were not
justified, possibly due to a lack of understanding or
appreciation of the benefits of an effective internal
review program /T36:3J7
Chapter IV defined five alternative organizational
structures for the internal review function, and conducted
an analysis of those alternatives using the classical
cost-benefit analysis as a model. The method of
evaluation was the "internal review balance sheet"
developed in Chapter III; and the analysis consisted of
two stages - a first-order analysis which sought out any
obvious reasons for dismissing an alternative, and a
second-order analysis which concentrated on the relevant
differences of the remaining alternatives.
The effect of the preceding four chapters was to
indicate an organizational structure which, when combined
with the operative requirements of sufficient staffing,
training, etc., offers the best prospects for obtaining
an effective internal review function in the DON.
This chapter will elaborate on the alternative
selected by discussing the pros and cons of centralization/
decentralization, and be redefining the selected
alternative in greater detail. Lastly, this chapter will
provide recommendations for defining and implementing the




The analysis conducted in the previous chapter
indicated that a decentralized but hierarchical internal
review organization structure offers the best prospect
for obtaining an effective internal review function.
The specific organizational alternative chosen by the
analysis defined internal review as: M a function
primarily serving and reporting to the local commander, with
some defined secondary responsibility to higher management .
"
This definition is compatible with the concept of
internal review as expressed by the Comptroller of the Navy
(NAVCOMPT) when he stated:
"Internal review is a function performed within a
command, at the direction of the head of that
command or in pursuance of a plan approved by him,
the results of which are reported to him." /~22:2-2_7
However, the alternative chosen by the analysis
recognizes that some facets of the internal review function
such as independence, analytical skill, and streamlining
other audit work do benefit from some degree of centralization
The question of centralizing or decentralizing an
organization or organization function, is one that has been
pursued in numerous articles and books on the subject of
management. Ross A. Webber offers some insight into the
discussion, in his text on management entitled: Management :




"Centralization is not like a disease you either
have or do not have. The range from centralization
to decentralization is a continuum, not an either/
or dichotomy . . .
Theoretically, a perfectly centralized
organization would have one authoratative person
at the very top who would be all -knowing and perfectly
wise. Therefore, that person could make all the
important decisions. The resulting organizational
performance would be exactly the same as with a
completely decentralized organization in which each
lowest level manager is perfectly knowledgeable and
wise about his or her area of responsibility. Thus
there is not theoretical advantage to either
centralization or decentralization; it depends on
those deceptively simple terms 'knowledgeable' and
'wise' ." £"38:3787
Mr. Webber further states that:
"The degree of centralization depends on the particular
organization, its situation, and its managerial
capacities. Each must work out a location along
the centralization/decentralization continuum
that best suits its needs." £" 38:379 J7
In summarizing the centralization/decentralization
debate, Mr. Webber offers the following arguments advanced
in support of both alternatives: ^38:379J7
1. Arguments advanced in support of centralization:
a. "Brilliant, energetic, and knowledgeable
people are rare, Therefore, it is appropriate
to concentrate authority in them."
b. "Whether small or large, organizations
require coordination and integration of their
various activities. This is best accomplished
by a centralized authority who can see overall
needs ."
c. "In a fairly sizable and diversified
organization, different functional and operating
managers will come to think differently and to
focus on their own units, perhaps exaggerating




From time to time, overall organizational
interest will require unpopular decisions that most
personnel will disagree with. Only a centralized
management can make such decisions."
d. "Confidentiality of strategic plans and tactical
decisions can be better maintained if restricted
to a small group at the top."
2. Arguments advanced in support of decentralization:
a. "As an organization becomes larger and more
complex, top management only deludes itself if it
thinks that it can maintain central control. This
is a physical impossibility. Since deteriorating
control is inevitable, delegation should be conducted
logically through decentralization."
b. "Decentralization lodges authority in the
managers most knowledgeable about the specific
details of their products, customers, and market
conditions. Hence, their policies and procedures
will be more appropriate than those set by
centralized authorities."
c. "Decentralization will create organizational
units small enough for managers to fully understand
and identify with. If a manager is given sufficient
authority, the organization can benefit from the
same kind of commitment and motivation as that of
the owner-manager."
d. "Pushing decision-making authority down the
organization will provide more people with an
opportunity to participate. General motivation and
job satisfaction will be greater and management
development more effective."
As a final aid to the determination of the extent of
centralization or decentralization from which an organization
may benefit, Webber offers the following questions for
consideration in the decision process. The implications,




1. "Who knows the facts on which decisions will be
based?" (top management - centralize; lower
management - decentralize)
2. "Who can get the information most readily?" (top
management - centralize; lower management -
decentralize)
3. "Who has the ability and knowledge to make sound
decisions?" (top management - centralize; lower
management - decentralize)
4. "Must speedy decisions be made to meet local
conditions?" (no - centralize; yes - decentralize)
5. "Must local decisions be carefully coordinated
with other activities, or are local units fairly
independent?" (coordination required - centralize;
independent - decentralize)
6. "How busy are top-level executives? Who has
the time to plan versus making operating decisions?"
(top management has the time to plan - centralize;
lower management has the time - decentralize)
7. "Will initiative and morale be improved by
decentralization? Will this help the organization?"
(self-explanatory)
The foregoing discussion of centralization/decentralization
was presented in order to provide the. reader with some
basic facts from which to judge the subsequent discussions
and recommendations.
The next sections will further amplify the alternative
chosen in the analysis; and provide some recommendations




C. AMPLIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE
The alternative selected by the analysis, bears a
close resemblance to the system currently in operation in
the Department of the Army (DA). Accordingly, the DA's
internal review system can serve as a model for designing
an internal review system for the DON.
1 . Local Organization and Staffing
As shown by the data presented in Chapter III, the
DA's internal review functions are for the most part
organizationally located under the local comptroller.
Likewise, the majority of DON internal review components
are also organized under the local comptroller.
In the interest of providing a greater appearance
of independence, ensuring direct communication, and
enhancing responsiveness and flexibility; it is the author's
opinion that the internal review function should be
organizationally located in a direct staff relationship
to the local commanding officer. The local comptroller,
as the command's designated financial manager, should
have advisory capacities both to the local commander and
to the internal review function. This would provide an
additional source of knowledge and informed opinion, to
both the local commander and to the head of the internal
review function.
The Task Force made a similar recommendation which
was concurred with by the DON:
166

"The local commander should personally direct the
application of internal review resources, and the
distribution of internal review reports should
be left solely to the commander." 37 :Encl. 1 J
The Task Force also recommended that the internal
review function's staffing level be kept small enough
to provide only a portion of the local commander's cyclic
audit needs, in order to remain a supplement to, rather
than a substitute for the internal audit function.
ZT37:Encl.l7
The DON concurred with this recommendation,
stating that the departmental level staff office, when
established, should define the policy. C 37 :Encl . 1 J
In the author's opinion, the size of the internal
review function should be such, as to allow the
accomplishment or oversight of all required audits such as
civilian timekeeping or non-appropriated fund audits; and
leave approximately 50 percent of the available man-hours
open for locally originated reviews.
At first glance this may appear excessive.
However, the author supports the continued use of the
local audit board concept as defined in Chapter III; as
does the DON. £ 37 :Encl.
1
J The revision proposed by the
author, is in the organization and use of the local audit
boards. The author proposes that the local internal review
function be formally delegated oversight authority and
focal point responsibility for all such boards by the
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local commander. This would have the effect, in the
author's opinion, of strengthening the local audit boards
by placing a professional auditor with full authority in
a management position. Also, it would relieve the local
commander of some administrative tasks. In addition,
there would then exist a single entity within the
organization (excluding the local commander, of course)
with cognizance of and control over all audit/review
functions. This would facilitate both internal and
external communications in the author's opinion; while
not degrading, and possibly even enhancing the effectiveness
and independence of the audit boards, because of the
independent organizational location of the internal review
function.
In other words, the multitude of local audit
boards, would be centralized under an independent
"internal review manager," who would report directly to
the local commander. These audit boards would continue to
be staffed by ad hoc/collateral duty personnel as they
are at present; but in the author's proposal they would
be coordinated by the internal review function.
By using these audit boards to the maximum extent,
the internal review function could accomplish most
"required" audit work through the use of trained and
properly supervised temporary personnel. The system
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proposed, is analogous to the common practice in private
sector auditing where a partner in an accounting firm is
assigned oversight responsibilities for a number of audits
at the same time. The partner manages an individual audit
through consultations with what would be the senior
member of the local audit board in the DON. Thus the
partner is able to supervise and provide guidance and
knowledge, without actually performing the work. This
concept allows one experienced professional to manage many-
individual audits.
However, the analogy does differ in at least one
important aspect. The "junior" auditors of a private sector
firm are employed as full-time professional auditors in
their own right, and are thus professionally motivated
for obvious reasons such as career advancement. On the
other hand, the personnel assigned on a collateral duty"
basis to local DON audit boards are normally professionally
oriented and evaluated for career advancement in fields
other than auditing.
While some of these personnel may be engaged in
related fields such as fiscal management, the majority are
professionally oriented and evaluated in such non-related
fields as engineering or aviation. The logical tendency
is an audit board member who is motivated toward his or
her own professional area and not toward the collateral
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assignment on a particular audit board. The logical end
result is unmotivated audit board personnel who view the
assignment as both undesired and undesirable; and who
tend to perform such a duty accordingly.
The logical net effect to the "internal review
manager" is an increased requirement to personally supervise
the planning and conduct of a particular audit, when
compared to a "partner" in the private sector.
In the author's opinion, the point to be made is
that while organizing the local audit boards under the
internal review function will not eliminate the basic
motivation/performance problem discussed above, it will
provide the direct professional supervision and guidance
now lacking which would tend to improve the quality of
such audits.
In addition, the number of personnel assigned to
the internal review staff should not have to be increased
on a one-for-one basis when assigned the task of managing
the local audit boards. Although each local command would
be somewhat unique, an estimate could be made regarding
the number of man-hours necessary to properly plan and
supervise all "required" audits to be conducted by local
audit boards. This man-hour estimate would vary between
commands depending upon both the quality of internal
review personnel, and the command support which is provided
by properly staffing the local audit boards.
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Added to the man-hours necessary for planning and
supervising local audit boards, would be the number of
man-hours necessary for the internal review staff them-
selves to conduct any additional "required" audits. This
total "required" man-hours would serve as a base for
computation of the man-hours to be devoted to locally
originated reviews.
Using the proposal made above, the calculated man-
hour figure would be doubled to determine the amount of
staffing required to provide the local commander with an
equal capacity for conducting both locally originated
reviews, and reviews of local activities which are required
by higher authority.
In summary, the author has proposed, based on
conclusions drawn from Chapters III and IV, that the
internal review function be organizationally located in- a
direct staff position to the local commander. In addition,
the author has proposed to consolidate all existing local
audit boards under the cognizance of the internal review
function. In the author's opinion, this would strengthen
the internal review function itself because of the
probability for increased command attention; and also serve
to streamline the work of the various local audit boards
because of centralized management by a professional auditor






























2 . Departmental Organization
Drawing upon the current organization of the
internal review function within the DA and the
recommendations of The Task Force; the author proposes
that the internal review function in the DON be organized
in a hierarchical structure. In order to preserve the
independence of the internal audit function when conducting
an audit of the internal review function, the hierarchical
entities should not fall under the overall direction of
the Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC) . Instead, the author
concurs in The Task Force recommendation, as does the DON,
that the hierarchical entities should fall under the
purview of NAVCOMPT, as the DON's financial manager.
£ 38:Encl.l_7
The Assistant Comptroller of the Navy (Financial
Management Systesm) has outlined the following as the
proposed assignment of responsibilities for internal review
in the DON: £"39:1, I J
a. NAVCOMPT functions
1. Career management for internal review personnel
2. Training course coordination
3. Doctrinal guidance (SECNAVINST 7510.8)
4. Development of staffing standards
5. Organizational placement guidance




1. Audit of internal review programs
2. Development of specialized audit programs
The NAVCOMPT functions are proposed to be
accomplished by establishing an internal review policy and
oversight component within the Performance Analysis and
Evaluation Division of NCFF-2/NAFC02 . ZT 39:1 J
Regarding the implications of hierarchical
organization as to the review of local commands by major
commands, the DON has expressed reservations in extending
the internal review function to permit major commands to
perform multilocation audits at subordinate commands.
/T 38 :Encl. 1 J The reason given, is that this practice
would subject the subordinate commands to still another
review of its operations by an external organization.
£ 38:Encl.l7
The author concurs in this reservation. The
author proposes that the internal review functions of
major commands limit their reviews of subordinate commands
to reviews of the internal review function only; unless
a review is requested by the local commander, or evidence
emerges which indicates possible fraud or gross mis-
management of resources.
This proposal is not in fact original. A senior
command has always had the prerogative of "inspecting" a
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subordinate command. This prerogative is a function of
the delegation of authority via the chain of command and
the traditional Naval notion that a senior is ultimately
responsible for a subordinate's actions. The use of an
internal review group to perform such an "inspection,"
in the author's opinion, is a logical use of personnel
resources. Unless specialized technical or operational
knowledge requirements exist, a professional auditor
should be able to conduct such a review more efficiently
and effectively, with less disruption to local operations,
than an ad hoc "inspector" not so qualified. In addition,
the use of an internal review function to conduct such an
"inspection" provides the senior commander a viable first
alternative to requesting assistance from such agencies
as the NAVAUDSVC or the Naval Investigative Service (NIS)
.
This alternative provides the senior commander with the"
internal review characteristic of "assistance without
advertising.
"
Therefore, in the author's opinion, the internal
review function in the DON should be hierarchically
organized with the higher echelons charged with the
routine responsibility for overseeing the professional
conduct of the lower echelons; much the same way as
currently exists in the DA. The reader is referred at
this point, to the discussion of the internal review
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function in the DA which was presented in Chapter III.
This discussion provided the salient points of the
oversight responsibility of higher echelon internal review;
and is not repeated here for the sake of brevity.
In summary, the author has proposed organizing the
internal review function in the DON in a hierarchical
manner along the existing structure of line authority.
The departmental echelon would be located in NAVCOMPT; and
would have the responsibilities listed above. The chain
of command, so to speak, would flow downward according to
the existing DON line hierarchy; with each echelon in
turn being professionally guided and overseen by the echelon
above, and professionally guiding and overseeing the
echelon below. This professional guidance and oversight
external to the command structure, if properly implemented,
would serve in the author's opinion, to enhance the
independence and professionalism of internal review
without detracting from the local commander's prerogatives.
It sould also provide the local internal review function a
"professional" chain from which to extract interpretations
and guidance concerning various rules, regulations,
procedures, and policies.
3. Definition of Secondary Responsibilities
As defined by the alternative chosen, the internal
review function's primary responsibility is to the local
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commander. However, some secondary responsibility is
denoted to higher management. The extent of this secondary
responsibility is, of course, a matter for the highest
DON decision makers.
It is apparent from the remarks quoted earlier
concerning the DON's reservation about adding an additional
review of subordinate commands by an external organization,
that the present inclination would be to limit the
internal review function's secondary responsibility to
higher management. The author concurs in this limitation,
based on the remarks and usage data previously presented
regarding the Department of the Air Force's (DAF)
Commander's Audit Program (CAP); and on the basic
definition of the internal review function.
In the author's opinion, the internal review
function's secondary responsibilities should be limited
to only those that are required to assist the local
commander to ensure that the internal review function is
performing its mission; or which provide basic management
information data. The author concurs, as does the DON,
with The Task Force recommendation that "The reports of
the Department's (of Defense) internal review . . .
components should not be included in the Department's




The secondary responsibilities envisioned by the
author would include such items as the approval of the
local annual audit plan by the next higher echelon only so
far as to ensure that all "required" audits are scheduled
in a proper manner; and the routine reporting of basic
personnel statistics such as positions authorized,
positions filled, training planned and accomplished, etc.
The downward responsibilities from the higher
echelons to the local internal review function would
include the provision of guidance, the interpretation of
policy, the provision of audit manual and audit program
updates, the provision and explanation of new or existing
audit procedures, the coordination and assistance with
training requirements, etc.
In short, the requirements envisioned by the
author are somewhat analagous to those existing in the
financial management area; but perhaps not quite as
extensive. For example, the local command's fiscal
officer, by whatever title, is directly responsible to the
local commander for the proper management and accounting
of the command's funds. The fiscal officer is provided
the policy, procedures, direction, and guidance necessary
to accomplish his or task through a secondary chain of
responsibility emanating downward from the departmental
level of financial management. The local fiscal officer
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therefore, is responsible not only to the local commander
for managing the command's fiscal resources but also to
the DON'S higher financial managers. On the positive
side, it is through this secondary or "professional"
chain that the fiscal officer gains the training, expertise,
and any additional guidance necessary to best discharge
his or her responsibility to the local commander.
The secondary responsibilities of the internal
review function then, would include the "professional" or
"how to" aspects of internal review. Except for those
audits required by higher authority, such as reviews of
non-appropriated fund activities, the "what to audit"
would be a primary responsibility the internal review
function would discharge under the direction of the local
commander. The "how to audit," would be a responsibility
discharged under the purview of the secondary or
"professional" chain. It should be obvious to the reader,
that the better the secondary responsibility is discharged,
the more benefits are to be gained by the local commander
from the internal review function.
In summary, the author proposes that the definition
of secondary responsibilities be one that is restricted
to "professional" issues or management information data.
The overall objective of these secondary responsibilities
should be to assist the local commander by helping to
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provide a well qualified, knowledgeable, and
professionally competent internal review function; not to
constitute an additional avenue of review and inspection
of the local command by an external organization.
As the data presented in Chapter II showed,
internal auditing as an individual component of management
control, did not begin to truly develop until its practi-
tioners gained independent, professional status. In the
author's opinion, if the secondary responsibilities of
the internal review function serve only to develop and
promote the "professionalization" of internal review, then
their objective will be accomplished; and the
"professional motivation" thus instilled will provide the
local commander with a competent internal review function
without the need for additional external scrutiny of the
local command.
D. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DON
In their report on the status of internal review in
the DON, the NAVAUDSVC opined that:
"While our audit reviews did not identify the
reason for non-compliance with these policies
(SECNAVINST 7510.8), it is reasonable to believe
that it is due to a local commands decision that
the billets or resources that would be required
to expand or establish an internal review program
are not justified. This may be due to a failure
of the command to understand or appreciate the
benefits that an effective internal review program
can accomplish. This would indicate a need to
provide convincing evidence to local commanders on
the benefits of an effective internal review program."
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The author concurs with this opinion and submits
that this "education" of local commanders must be the
first substantive task in implementing the recommended
alternative in the DON. In addition, the DON must support
the local commander by assisting in the determination
and provision of a sufficient competent internal review
staff. In the author's opinion, the current DON policy
as stated in SECNAVINST 7510.8 of providing for internal
review resources from within available resources, is not
conducive to the establishment or expansion of the internal
review function, to say the least.
In a time of shortages of both personnel and fiscal
resources, it is logical that many local commanders would
decide in a rational manner that the billets required
for an internal review staff function were simply not
justified; given the fact that they must come from some
other operationally oriented area within the local
command which is possibly already short of personnel. It
must be a task of higher echelons, even to the departmental
level, to assist the local commander in both determining
the number and type of billets required; and securing
personnel to fill these billets from outside the local
command.
Thus support of the local commander in a tangible
manner by higher authority, would serve in the author's
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opinion, to provide a conducive foundation for the
development of an effective internal review function. It
would cement the emphasis being placed in the program.
Once the foundation has been laid, the execution of
the secondary responsibilities discussed in the previous
section would result, in the author's opinion, in the
education by example of local commanders as to the benefits
to be derived from an effective internal review function.
One of the important aspects of implementing any new
"system," is ensuring that the personnel selected are
properly qualified and trained. To this end, the author
proposes that all cadre internal review personnel assigned
to an internal review function in the DON should be
professional auditors, as is the case in the DA. Going a
step further, the author recommends that a basic internal
review curriculum be developed from the available training
courses; and that cadre internal review personnel be
required to complete the basic course within a certain time
period (for argument's sake, one year) after appointment.
Appendix B provides a partial list of the courses of
instruction currently available.
The curriculum could be tailored if necessary; and
could even be a centrally managed DOD-wide program such
as the Defense Procurement Management Courses conducted
by the Army Logistics Management Center. On the other
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hand, such a curriculum might be instituted at an existing
DON educational institution in much the same manner as
the Practical Coraptrollership Course conducted at the
Naval Postgraduate School.
In whatever form, the author feels that a mandatory-
training program administered and even funded from the
department level is necessary to ensure professional
internal review personnel are qualified and properly
trained. Requiring local commanders to administer and
fund professional audit/financial training in an era of
"tight money;" is risking the same results as indicated
in the NAVAUDSVC and Task Force reports - little or no
training. £9:CJ, £"11:136 J
The author also recommends that a policy of continuing
Professional education be developed along much the same
lines as that required for Certified Public Accountants"
(CPA) in the private sector. As a CPA licensed to practice
in the State of Louisiana, the author is required to
participate in at least 120 hours of continuing professional
education every three years in order to retain licensee
status. This requirement equates to approximately one
week per year, and hardly seems excessive.
In summary, the status of the internal review function
in the DON presented in Chapter III, showed it to be
marginally effective in some areas, and ineffective in
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others. The author's proposal for a hierarchical internal
review system in the DON could be implemented from the
existing decentralized system without too many substantial
changes or disruptions. The crux of the matter is the
proper education of local commanders; and the initial and
continuing support of these local commanders by higher
authority, concerning the recruitment and training of
qualified cadre personnel.
The hierarchical structure would tend to ascertain
those local commands without an internal review function
which needed one; and would serve as stable professional
force for established internal review functions.
A mandatory centrally managed and funded professional
training program would tend to provdie the local commander
with knowledgeable and professional personnel who, in
turn, would provide the local commander with tangible
evidence of the benefits to be derived from an effective
internal review program.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the reader with the author's
proposals for defining and implementing a hierarchical
internal review function in the DON. These proposals
were based on literary research and subjective analysis of
the internal review function in the DON. The specific




1. Internal review in the DON should be a function
primarily serving and reporting to the local commander,
with some defined secondary responsibility to higher
management.
2. The internal review function should be locally
organized in a direct staff relationship to the
local commander.
3. The internal review function should be delagated
the authority, and tasked with managing, all local
audit boards.
4. Departmentally , the internal review function
should be hierarchically tiered according to the
existing line organization, with overall management
responsibility emanating from NAVCOMPT.
5. NAVAUDSVC should retain audit responsibility;
and the responsibility for developing specialized
audit programs for use by the internal review
function.
6. The secondary responsibilities of internal
review should be limited to professional issues
or the provision of basic management information.
7. Any reviews of lower echelon internal review
functions by higher echelon functions should be
limited to the review of the local internal review
function itself, not of the local command.
8. The education of local commanders as to the
benefits to be gained from an effective internal
review function should receive first priority in
the implementation of the new "system."
9. The DON policy regarding the provision of internal
review assets from within existing personnel resources
should be modified to one of using existing assets
whenever feasible; but of providing aggressive
support to local commanders in acquiring personnel
from outside the command whenever necessary.
10. A mandatory and centrally managed professional
training program should be established using
existing courses as the core.
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11. A program of continuing professional education
should be developed and implemented in concert with
the basic professional training.
12. Professional training costs should be borne by
the central administration if possible, to avoid
repetition of past "trade-offs" when an austere funding
climate exists.
As a final summary, the author has chosen the following
excerpt by Victor Z. Brink which has been paraphrased and
edited into a DON context: /T 15 : 35
_7
It is in, indeed, a time for thoughtful and soundly
determined action.
Internal reviewers occupy a strategic position.
Possessing the special, technical competence in the basic
areas of internal control and having been indoctrinated in
the broader areas of effective managerial results, they are
especially well equipped to make a major contribution.
There is a need for all interested parties to better
understand the breadth of the services which can be provided
by internal reviewers and to assure that broader utilization.
In this context, internal reviewers also have a responsibility
to convey that needed understanding, in the interest of
their profession and in the interest of the DON as a whole.
Internal reviewers must take major steps to prepare
themselves to adequately discharge a greater range and
higher levels of service.
Altogether, this means new opportunities and further
professional growth and development for internal reviewers.
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If the time has come for internal reviewers, one hopes
they will do everything possible to develop the capabilities
to properly utilize the expanding opportunities. • And in
all of their endeavors, internal reviewers will need the








a. Are sufficient personnel assigned to
accomplish the intent of internal review?
(SECNAVINST 7510.8)
b. Do assigned personnel have the necessary-
technical qualifications? (SECNAVINST 7510.8)
c. Do the working papers reflect the
necessary technical competence? (Pomeranz -96)
d. Is adequate training provided on a
continuing basis? (SECNAVINST 7510.8)
e. Is adequate supervision provided?
(SECNAVINST 7310.8)
2. Organization
a. Is internal review authorized in a local
regulation? (Pomeranz-94)
b. Does internal review have its own budget?
(Pomeranz-94)
c. Have steps been taken to avoid intententional
duplication with NAVAUDSVC activities?
(SECNAVINST 7510.8)
d. Does the internal review staff have complete
independence in order to make recommendations






a. Is there an annual internal review
program that ensures scheduling of those
areas of mandatory and traditional audit
coverage and allows for operational studies
and reviews especially in areas that may
lend themselves to fraud or waste?
(NAS-32)
b. Is the audit coverage of functional
areas performed by internal review
satisfactory? (NAS-32)
c. Does internal review accomplish the
required audit liaison and follow-up actions?
(MCO 7540. 2A)
d. Are internal reviews performed properly?
(MCO 7540. 2A)
e. Do the working papers properly document
the reviews? (MCO 7540. 2A)
f. Are internal review programs and
objectives revised to reflect changing
conditions? (Pomeranz-97)
g. Are internal review activities directed
toward appropriate projects, rather than
clerical tasks? (Pomeranz-97)
h. Does internal review provide orientation
training on the provisions of R.S. 3679 to newly
assigned personnel who will be dealing with
appropriated funds? (MCO 7540. 2A)
4. Reporting
a. Are internal review findings and
recommendations reported to the Commander
properly? (MCO 7540. 2A)
b. Does the Commander get involved in correction
of reported deficiencies? (MCO 7540. 2A)
c. Does internal review enjoy the support and




d. Are findings dollarized where practical?
(Pomeranz-100)
e. Are findings usually accepted?
(Pomeranz-100)
f. Are recommendations usually accepted?
(Pomeranz-100)
g. Do internal review reports require a
written response by the reviewee? (Pomeranz-
100)
h. Are reports followed up as to whether
deficiencies are corrected and recommendations
considered? (Pomeranz-100)
REF: (1) SECNAVINST 7510.8, Internal Review in the
Department of the Navy.
(2) MCO 7540. 2A, Internal Review.
(3) (NAS) NAVAUDSVC Notice 7500, Audit Program
Series
.
(4) Pomeranz, and others, Auditing in the Public
Sector
,
Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 1976
.
(5) Sawyer, L. B., The Practice of Modern Internal
Auditing
,
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can be obtained from the List of Training Manuals and
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